# Case Neg – Militarism

### CX

#### What is anti-military criticism? What colleges currently have restrictions on anti-military criticism?

#### How does protest on campus spill over to end aspects of American foreign policy or hegemony abroad? Why do students specifically matter?

## 1NC

### OFF

### 1NC Courts

#### Counterplan Text: The Supreme Court of the United States, in the next available test case, should rule that public colleges and universities ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech that criticizes the military’s policies.

#### Lawsuits are piling up against free speech restrictions – the counterplan strengthens First Amendment protections and solves the entirety of the case

Watanabe 14 [Teresa Watanabe (covers education for the LA Times), "Students challenge free-speech rules on college campuses," LA Times, 7/1/2014] AZ

College students in California and three other states filed lawsuits against their campuses Tuesday in what is thought to be the first-ever coordinated legal attack on free speech restrictions in higher education. Vincenzo Sinapi-Riddle, a 20-year-old studying computer science, alleged that Citrus College in Glendora had violated his 1st Amendment rights by restricting his petitioning activities to a small "free-speech zone" in the campus quad. According to Sinapi-Riddle's complaint, a campus official stopped him last fall from talking to another student about his campaign against spying by the National Security Agency, saying he had strayed outside the free-speech zone. The official said he had the authority to eject Sinapi-Riddle from campus if he did not comply. "It was shocking to me that there could be so much hostility about me talking to another student peacefully about government spying," Sinapi-Riddle said in an interview. "My vision of college was to express what I think." In his lawsuit, Sinapi-Riddle is challenging Citrus' free-speech zone, an anti-harassment policy that he argues is overly broad and vague and a multi-step process for approving student group events. The college had eliminated its free-speech zones in a 2003 legal settlement with another student, but last year "readopted in essence the unconstitutional policy it abandoned," the complaint alleged. College officials were not immediately available for comment. But communications director Paula Green forwarded copies of Citrus' free-speech policy, which declares that the campus is a "non-public forum" except where otherwise designated to "prevent the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the college." The policy instructs the college to enact procedures that "reasonably regulate" free expression. The "Stand Up for Speech" litigation project is sponsored by the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, a Philadelphia-based group that promotes free speech and due process rights at colleges and universities. Its aim is to eliminate speech codes and other campus policies that restrict expression. In a report published this year, the foundation found that 58% of 427 major colleges and universities surveyed maintain restrictive speech codes despite what it called a "virtually unbroken string of legal defeats" against them dating to 1989. Even in California — unique in the nation for two state laws that explicitly bar free speech restrictions at both public and private universities — the majority of campuses retain written speech codes, he said. Among 16 California State University campuses surveyed by the group, for instance, 11 were rated "red" for employing at least one policy that "substantially restricts" free speech. "Universities are scared of people who demand censorship -- they're afraid of lawsuits and PR problems," said Robert Shibley, the foundation’s senior vice president. "Unfortunately, they are more worried about that than about ignoring their 1st Amendment responsibilities," he added. "The point of the project is to balance out the incentives that cause universities to institute rules that censor speech." The foundation intends to target campuses in each of four federal court circuits; after each case is settled, it will file another lawsuit. In other cases filed Tuesday: — [Iowa State University](http://www.latimes.com/topic/education/colleges-universities/iowa-state-university--OREDU0000581-topic.html) students Paul Gerlich and Erin Furleigh challenged administrative rejection of their campus club T-shirt promoting legalization of marijuana. The university said the shirt violated rules that bar the use of the school name to promote "dangerous, illegal or unhealthy" products and behavior, according to the complaint. — [Chicago State University](http://www.latimes.com/topic/education/colleges-universities/chicago-state-university-OREDU000801-topic.html) faculty members Phillip Beverly and Robert Bionaz sued over what they said were repeated attempts to silence a blog they write on alleged administrative corruption. — [Ohio University](http://www.latimes.com/topic/education/colleges-universities/ohio-university-OREDU000671-topic.html) student Isaac Smith challenged the campus speech code that forbids any act that "degrades, demeans or disgraces another." University officials invoked the code to veto a T-shirt by Smith’s Students Defending Students campus group — which defends peers accused of campus disciplinary offenses. The T-shirt said, "We get you off for free," a phrase that administrators found "objectified women" and "promoted prostitution," the complaint said.

### 1NC Whistleblowers

#### The United States federal government should establish congressional oversight over the National Insider Threat Policy.

#### **The plan’s establishment of oversight is key— employee education and strict legal review protects whistleblowers from federal retaliation— the ITP undermines the WPA and creates a chilling effect that deters whistleblowers now**

Canterbury 14

(Angela, Director of Public Policy, “POGO's Angela Canterbury testifies on “Limitless Surveillance at the FDA: Protecting the Rights of Federal Whistleblowers” February 26, 2014, pg online @ <http://www.pogo.org/our-work/testimony/2014/pogos-angela-canterbury-testifies.html> //um-ef)

Whistleblowers are the guardians of the public trust and safety. Without proper controls at FDA and throughout the government, employee surveillance is a serious threat to whistleblower protections. The resulting chilling effect will significantly reduce accountability—thus keeping waste, fraud, abuse, and threats to public health and safety in the shadows. Whistleblowers also are among the best partners in crime-fighting. It is a well-known fact that whistleblowers have saved countless lives and billions of taxpayer dollars. A survey conducted in 2012 by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners found that nearly half of occupational fraud cases were uncovered by a tip or complaint from an employee, customer, vendor, or other source.[46] In the case of fraud perpetrated by owners and executives, more than half were uncovered by tips from whistleblowers. A 2011 academic study confirmed that whistleblowers play a bigger role than external auditors, government regulators, self-regulatory organizations, or the media in detecting fraud.[47] But perhaps the best illustration of how whistleblowers can save taxpayer dollars is the more than $38 billion recovered since 1987 through the hugely successful False Claims Act (FCA), championed by Senator Grassley.[48] The FCA prohibits a person or entity from fraudulently or dishonestly obtaining or using government funds. The law not only acts as a deterrent, but also incentivizes whistleblowing through the financial awards and strong protections against retaliation.[49] Federal Circuit Court Judge Kenneth Keller Hall said that the FCA provisions supplement the government’s “regular troops” since it “let loose a posse of ad hoc deputies to uncover and prosecute frauds against the government."[50] But unfortunately, the cost-benefit analysis for most whistleblowing is so often all cost to the whistleblower and all benefit to society. Professor Richard E. Moberly in his testimony before Congress aptly stated: Furthermore, almost all the benefits of a whistleblower’s disclosure go to people other than the whistleblower: society as a whole benefits from increased safety, better health, and more efficient law enforcement. However, most of the costs fall on the whistleblower. There is an enormous public gain if whistleblowers can be encouraged to come forward by reducing the costs they must endure. An obvious, but important, part of reducing whistleblowers’ costs involves protecting them from retaliation after they disclose misconduct.[51] Whistleblowing works for the public, but not without strong protections for the whistleblower. Recognizing this, Congress has repeatedly strengthened the rights and procedures available to whistleblowers. In 2012, Chairman Issa and Ranking Member Cummings—along with Representative Van Hollen, then-Representative Platts, and their Senate colleagues—championed the latest enhancements to federal employee protections with the enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act.[52] While these reforms go a long way to improve the prospects for whistleblowing on government wrongdoing, employee surveillance, left unaddressed, seriously undermines these and other statutory protections for whistleblowers that Congress intended. An Opportunity for Reform This committee’s attention to the unacceptable actions of the managers at FDA will hopefully serve as a catalyst for government-wide reforms. Certainly security concerns and available technology will outstrip the protection of civil liberties, whistleblower protections, and other constitutional rights unless there is a concerted effort to consider all of these goals together. We can and should move towards a better policy and to ensure more accountability now. But if left to their own devices, the agencies cannot be expected to get this right. The FDA and other agencies should not be in the surveillance or law enforcement business. Federal agencies cannot be allowed to police themselves—that is why we have IGs, the OSC, DoJ, and Congress. Investigations of unauthorized, illegal disclosures of information and other criminal misconduct must be conducted by law enforcement investigators—such as the FBI or the Inspectors General—not bureaucrats. While we acknowledge there may be a very limited need for agencies to gather evidence of wrongdoing by employees when there is reasonable suspicion of non-criminal misconduct, the electronic surveillance is ripe for abuse—as demonstrated by the FDA. Even with just cause and proper controls, it will be difficult, if not impossible to ensure constitutional rights are not violated. To what end? As with the NSA domestic surveillance, the risks to our rights may be greater than the ability of the surveillance to protect against risks to security. On September 12, 2012, FDA Commissioner Hamburg issued a memorandum directing the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Chief Counsel to “promptly develop a written procedure” for employee surveillance that includes some safeguards (Hamburg Memo).[53] Presumably, that written procedure is embodied in the interim policies and procedures established last September by the FDA in its Staff Manual Guide (Interim Policy).[54] No doubt the FDA is in a tough spot, attempting to put into place a process that is more proscribed for surveillance critics, but also placating the lawyers for drug and device companies that demand that information be kept confidential. Needless to say, the FDA doesn’t have it right yet. Nothing in this policy would prevent the FDA Commissioner or Chief Operating Officer from using information collected by the surveillance as retaliation for whistleblowing or providing it to others who might. The policy does little to lift the chilling effect at FDA that fosters waste, fraud, abuse, and threats to public health and safety. How can the FDA ensure the public’s health and safety if scientists and physicians are too afraid to come forward when deadly mistakes are made? Instead, the interim policy would allow the FDA managers to control a vast and far-reaching surveillance program without any oversight from an independent outside entity. Rather than protect whistleblowers from unwarranted FDA surveillance, this policy protects the FDA from whistleblowers and shields it from accountability. Simply stating that the FDA will follow existing laws to protect whistleblowers is not enough—the procedures do not build in strong, substantive safeguards. The Interim Policy does attempt to protect some sensitive communications by prohibiting the targeting of communications with law enforcement, the OSC, members of Congress or their staff, employee union officials, or private attorneys. However, it does not include a similar prohibition on other protected disclosures—most notably, public whistleblowing, which is protected as long as the disclosure of the information is not prohibited under law. Congress protected public whistleblowing because we live in a democracy that relies on an informed public and freedom of the press. In numerous instances, threats to public health and safety, waste, fraud, and abuse and other wrongdoing would never have come to light or been addressed without public whistleblowing.[55] The FDA has not ensured employees, contractors, and grantees can exercise all of their legal rights without fear of retaliation. Thus, any final policy must prohibit specifically monitoring communications with anyone that may include a protected disclosure. According to the Whistleblower Protection Act, these communications would include a reasonable belief that the disclosure evidences “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.'[56] In practice, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the inadvertent capture of protected disclosures while monitoring employee communications. Therefore, any final policy must mandate a legal review and express authorization before any potentially protected communication that is collected is shared. Notification of potential legal pitfalls to recipients of collected information, as called for in the Hamburg Memo, is woefully insufficient.[57] The FDA must do more to ensure all agency personnel and federal fund recipients are better trained in whistleblower protections. Under the WPA, it is the responsibility of the head of each agency, in consultation with the Office of Special Counsel, to ensure that agency employees are informed of the rights and remedies available to them under the Whistleblower Protection Act.[58] The OSC, has a certification program which allows agencies to demonstrate that they have fulfilled this legal obligation. Last year, only three agencies sought and received certification—and, remarkably, the FDA was not one of them.[59] Clearly, certification should not be voluntary. Last December, in its second National Action Plan for the Open Government Partnership, the Obama Administration committed to taking steps over the next two years with the stated goal of strengthening and expanding protections for federal whistleblowers.[60] These commitments include mandating participation in the Office of Special Counsel’s Whistleblower Certification Program. However, Congress should ensure that agency compliance with the WPA notification requirement and certification will continue into the future by putting the requirement into statute. Federal contractors and grantees also are required to notify their employees of the whistleblower protections available to them.[61] There should be a mechanism to certify this compliance as well. Perhaps this could be part of the contracting or grant-making process, or the Whistleblower Ombudsmen in the Offices of Inspectors General could play a role. The Inspectors General have responsibilities to conduct investigations of claims of retaliation by contractor and grantee employees, as well as by national security and intelligence community workers.[62] Agencies are currently certifying compliance with Presidential Policy Directive 19, which protects national security and intelligence community whistleblowers. These certifications should be made public, but so far only the Department of Defense has done so. Additionally, a memo and staff manual guide will not alone ensure that privacy, whistleblower, and civil service rights are protected in employee surveillance. The policies and procedures for safeguarding employee rights whenever investigations or surveillance is conducted should include penalties for violations and should have the force of law. Therefore, a permanent regulation for all of HSS—not just the FDA—would be most appropriate. However, there ought to be a government-wide approach. The Department of Justice has the appropriate legal expertise for developing such policy, in consultation with the OSC and MSPB. Moreover, the FDA is only attempting to write a policy ad hoc because of all the unwanted attention it’s receiving. But what is to prevent other agencies from spying on employees without regard to the legal rights of these employees? Congress and/or the President must mandate a government-wide policy to protect whistleblower and other constitutional rights and prevent future abuses. Of course, interfering with communications to Congress[63] and retaliating for whistleblowing[64] is against the law. Although the law does protect the identity of whistleblowers in other ways—the OSC and IG are prohibited from disclosing the identity of whistleblowers except in certain circumstances[65]—there is little to prevent other agencies from identifying whistleblowers by collecting communications. Congress should consider amending the WPA and contractor protections to specifically prohibit an agency from using collected communications to identify a whistleblower. Today, we don’t know nearly enough about the scope of employee surveillance across the government. We hope that this committee will order a comprehensive study of how agencies are currently conducting surveillance of employees while protecting their rights. Far more needs to be known about current practices, legal protections, effectiveness, and cost. A government-wide study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and/or the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) would provide the executive branch and Congress with a more complete picture and recommendations for best-practice policies.[66] Naturally, there also must be a different approach with the ever-growing intelligence and national security workforce. More and more of the federal workforce is labeled as national security sensitive—and there is a jaw-dropping lack of oversight. The number of people cleared for access to classified information reached a record high in 2012, soaring to more than 4.9 million.[67] Add to that untold numbers of civil servants and contractors without access to classified information, but in positions labeled as national security sensitive.[68] In order to prevent leaks of classified information, it is critical that there are truly safe channels for legal disclosures. We have long been concerned about the potential for abuse of whistleblowers as a result of Insider Threat programs mandated by the President and Congress.[69] The program pits employees against one another,[70] creating an atmosphere of suspicion and intimidation likely to silence would-be whistleblowers. Intended to protect national security, implementation of the Insider Threat Program at agencies that have little to do with national security issues suggests a serious overreach. Blurring the line between spies and whistleblowers can only harm national security. An investigation by McClatchy last year discovered that agencies were using the Insider Threat Program as grounds to pursue unauthorized disclosures of unclassified information—information that whistleblowers can legally disclose to anyone under current law.[71] We hope this committee will also conduct rigorous oversight of whistleblower protections for the national security and intelligence community workforce. Importantly, we must not lose sight of what brought us here today. Scientists at the FDA were concerned about a device approval process that they believed might put lives at risk. We urge you to ensure that the critical work being done by the CDRH puts the public’s health and safety first. Bureaucrats at FDA should not be allowed to overrule the findings of expert scientists and physicians, except under extraordinary circumstances. There are no criminal penalties for FDA officials who allow unsafe devices to be approved. FDA officials should be held accountable for approving ineffective or unsafe products, and flawed devices must be taken off the market. There must be far more transparency and less deference to the demands for confidentiality by the drug and device companies. Finally, please do all you can to ensure the FDA whistleblowers get the justice that they deserve and that FDA managers are held accountable for any violations of the rights of the scientists and physicians who sought to make medical devices safer and more effective. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. POGO and the Make It Safe Coalition pledge to continue to work with you to fulfill the promise of a government that is truly open and accountable to the American people. I look forward to your questions.

#### Solves the case – creates Congressional oversight that prevents militaristic overreach of power

Goodman 13

(Melvin, PhD, former CIA Analyst, adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, former professor of international relations at the National War College, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, “The Need for National Security Leaks,” pg online @ https://consortiumnews.com/2013/06/19/the-need-for-national-security-leaks/ //um-ef)

The attack line against whistleblowers Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden – that they should have gone through “proper channels” – ignores that those oversight channels have been badly corrupted over the past several decades. That has left Americans dependent on out-of-channel leaks, says ex-CIA analyst Melvin A. Goodman. A major problem in the United States is not there are too many whistleblowers … there are too few. Where were the whistleblowers when the Central Intelligence Agency was operating secret prisons; conducting torture and abuse; and kidnapping individuals off the streets in Europe and the Middle East and turning them over to foreign intelligence agencies that conducted torture and abuse? Where were the whistleblowers when the National Security Agency violated the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and conducted widespread warrantless eavesdropping? Where were the whistleblowers when the State Department permitted the use of a consulate to serve as a cover for an inadequately protected intelligence platform in Benghazi? Where were the whistleblowers when the Pentagon was building secret facilities in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula in order to conduct military strikes in countries where the United States was not at war? President Barack Obama, a Harvard-trained lawyer and former professor of constitutional law, has made it particularly difficult for whistleblowers and has displayed a stunning disregard for the balance of power and the need for oversight of foreign policy decision-making. He has pursued more leak investigations than all previous presidents combined since the passage of the Espionage Act in 1919. Several press disclosures have been referred to the Justice Department for investigation, and in May 2013 the department subpoenaed two months of records for 20 telephone lines used by Associated Post reporters and editors. This was the most aggressive federal seizure of media records since the Nixon administration. Attorney General Eric Holder even departed from First Amendment norms by approving an affidavit for a search warrant that named a Fox News reporter as a possible co-conspirator in violations of the Espionage Act, because the reporter might have received classified information while doing his job. President Obama has also inexplicably contributed to the need for whistleblowers by weakening the traditional institutions for oversight in the national security process, the Office of the Inspector General. Inspectors General are not popular institutions within the federal government, but they are essential for keeping the government honest by unearthing fraud, abuse and other illegal activities. The Obama administration from the outset focused on weakening the OIG at the CIA by taking more than a year and a half to replace an outstanding IG, John Helgerson, whose staff had exposed the improprieties linked to extraordinary renditions as well as torture and abuse. The most outrageous pursuit of a whistleblower was conducted against Thomas Drake, who determined that NSA eavesdroppers were squandering hundreds of millions of dollars on failed programs while ignoring privacy issues. Drake took his issues to the IG at NSA, the IG at the Pentagon, and to the congressional intelligence committees. (I am aware of individuals who have contacted congressional staffers with issues that required congressional scrutiny, but were warned that they would not receive a friendly reception from key members of the committee.) After failing in these efforts, Drake turned to a reporter from the Baltimore Sun. As a result, Drake faced ten felony charges involving mishandling of classified information and obstruction of justice, which a judge wisely dismissed. The case of Bradley Manning also demonstrates the mindset of the Obama administration and the mainstream media. Although Manning has entered a plea of guilty to charges that would give him a 20-year prison sentence, the government is pursuing a charge of aiding the enemy, which would mean a life sentence. The government has also ignored the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a “speedy and public trial,” with Manning’s trial beginning on June 3, nearly three years after his arrest. The military handling of Manning, particularly its imposition of unconscionable solitary confinement, has amounted to abuse and is in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” The scant coverage of the trial in the press is another example of the marginalization of a whistleblower. The absence of checks and balances in the national security system over the past ten years has virtually assured the abuse of power that has taken place. In general, Congress has acquiesced in the questionable actions of both the Bush and Obama administrations since 2001, permitting foreign policy to be the sole preserve of the Executive Branch and not the shared responsibility of the President and the Congress. Congressional intelligence committees have become advocates for the intelligence community, particularly the CIA, instead of rigorous watchdogs. Similarly, the Armed Services committees have been advocates for the Pentagon and have not monitored the abuses of weapon’s acquisitions programs. Since the Vietnam War, we have observed a system of judicial tolerance, with the Supreme Court only intervening on foreign policy matters to endorse the policies and powers of the President. This deferential attitude toward the White House has resulted in an absence of judicial scrutiny of illegalities, including warrantless eavesdropping and the destruction of the torture tapes at the CIA that documented torture going beyond methods authorized by the Justice Department. Ironically, the destroyer of the 92 videotapes of interrogations, Jose Rodriquez, who ignored a White House order not to destroy the tapes and should have faced at least obstruction of justice charges, has published a book sanctioned by the CIA that maligns the OIG for a “holier-than-thou attitude and the prosecutorial ways they routinely treated fellow CIA employees.” In addition to the failure of Congress and the courts to provide necessary regulation and oversight of the national security process, the mainstream media has been complacent about its watchdog role regarding secret agencies in a democratic arena. The media require the efforts of contrarians and whistleblowers in order to penetrate the secrecy of the policy and intelligence communities, but typically ignore the reprisals taken against whistleblowers. Often, they disdain the information provided by whistleblowers that is critical of senior officials and government agencies – preferring to protect their access to these officials. David Ignatius of the Washington Post falsely claimed that journalists “instinctively side with leakers,” but he was quick to ridicule Edward Snowden who has exposed NSA’s spying on millions of Americans‘ phone records and the Internet activity of hundreds of millions of foreigners. Ignatius, moreover, has been an apologist for the CIA and has relied on clandestine operatives to present a one-sided picture of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. His novel (Agents of Innocence) provided a laudatory account of CIA tradecraft, relying on sensitive leaks from a senior operations officer. My own experience with the mainstream media as a whistleblower is revelatory. During my congressional testimony in 1991 against the nomination of Robert M. Gates as director of CIA, I provided background information to Elaine Sciolino of the New York Times in order to counter malicious rumors emanating from the White House that was designed to compromise my credibility. Sciolino initially reported this information accurately, but then tilted to support Gates’s confirmation. In a conversation several weeks after the confirmation hearings, Sciolino explained that it was becoming obvious that Gates would be confirmed and would be an important source to her as a CIA director. She added that, as I would return to the National War College as a professor of international relations, I would be of little further use. Sciolino noted that whistleblowers make good sources only in the short run, while journalists must rely on policymakers for long-term access and should not gratuitously offend them. This explains the conventional analysis offered by the press corps and its reluctance to challenge official sources. As a result of the imbalance in the process of foreign policy decision-making, we have come full circle from President Woodrow Wilson, who wanted to make the “world safe for democracy,” to Presidents George W. Bush and Obama, who find the world too dangerous to honoring constitutional democracy. The excesses of the Vietnam War; Watergate; Iran-Contra; and the Global War on Terror have contributed to the creation of a dangerous national security state and a culture of secrecy. Whistleblowers can help all of us decide whether the ends justify the means regarding these excesses. Meanwhile, secrecy itself has fostered dangerous ignorance in the United States. The overuse of secrecy limits necessary debate and dialogue on foreign policy and deprives citizens of information on which to make policy and political judgments. Only a counter-culture of openness and a respect for the balance of power in the conduct of foreign policy can reverse the damage of the past decade. As long as Congress defers to the President in the conduct of foreign policy; the courts intervene to prevent any challenge to the power of the President in the making of foreign policy; and the media defer to authorized sources, we will need courageous whistleblowers.

### Endowments DA

#### Donations to colleges growing at rapid rate – survey of 983 colleges proves

Lederman 16 [Doug Lederman (editor, co-founder of Inside Higher Ed), "In Giving to Colleges, the One Percenters Gain," Inside Higher Ed, 1/27/2016] AZ

The Council for Aid to Education's study is one of a handful of annual reports (along with today's on endowments, last week's on state support for higher education, and some others) that provide a baseline sense of the state of higher education finances. The survey drew fund-raising information from 983 institutions, and it extrapolates from those results to estimate total giving for 3,900 colleges and universities. The 7.6 percent rise revealed for 2015 by the council's survey, which followed a 10.8 percent gain from 2013 to 2014, was driven largely by giving from individuals (alumni and not), which increased sharply. Donations from foundations and corporations, meanwhile, were either modest or flat, as seen in the table below. Continuing a trend of recent years, the amount of money donated by alumni rose sharply, by 10.2 percent, to $10.85 billion, but the proportion of alumni who contributed fell to 8.4 percent, from 8.6 percent. (It was 11.7 percent in 2007.) Ann E. Kaplan, who directs the survey, attributed the decline mostly to the fact that digital and other technologies are helping colleges track down more alumni. "Participation will only increase if the number of donors rises more than the number of located alumni," Kaplan said in a news release. "This is unlikely in a technological age in which individuals may have multiple means of contact that make them easy to locate. Finding an address is much simpler than cultivating a relationship that leads to a contribution." Giving by nonalumni individuals (donors, parents, etc.) rose by more than any other category, 23.1 percent. Donations for current operations (as opposed to capital purposes) rose by 13.1 percent in fiscal 2015, while funds for endowments, facilities and other purposes were flat. The study attributes the latter result to the fact that there was a huge -- 23.3 percent -- rise the previous year (fiscal 2014) in gifts to restricted endowments, which is the largest category of capital purposes. That kind of donation tends to track the stock market, which was stronger in 2014 than in 2015.

#### Protests crush donations

Hartocollis 8/4 – Anemona Hartocollis, writer for NYT: August 4, 2016(“College Students Protest, Alumni’s Fondness Fades and Checks Shrink” New York Times Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/us/college-protests-alumni-donations.html?_r=0> Accessed on 12/15/16)IG

Scott MacConnell cherishes the memory of his years at Amherst College, where he discovered his future métier as a theatrical designer. But protests on campus over cultural and racial sensitivities last year soured his feelings.

Now Mr. MacConnell, who graduated in 1960, is expressing his discontent through his wallet. In June, he cut the college out of his will.

“As an alumnus of the college, I feel that I have been lied to, patronized and basically dismissed as an old, white bigot who is insensitive to the needs and feelings of the current college community,” Mr. MacConnell, 77, wrote in a letter to the college’s alumni fund in December, when he first warned that he was reducing his support to the college to a token $5.

A backlash from alumni is an unexpected aftershock of the campus disruptions of the last academic year. Although fund-raisers are still gauging the extent of the effect on philanthropy, some colleges — particularly small, elite liberal arts institutions — have reported a decline in donations, accompanied by a laundry list of g5.

Alumni from a range of generations say they are baffled by today’s college culture. Among their laments: Students are too wrapped up in racial and identity politics. They are allowed to take too many frivolous courses. They have repudiated the heroes and traditions of the past by judging them by today’s standards rather than in the context of their times. Fraternities are being unfairly maligned, and men are being demonized by sexual assault investigations. And university administrations have been too meek in addressing protesters whose messages have seemed to fly in the face of free speech.

Scott C. Johnston, who graduated from Yale in 1982, said he was on campus last fall when activists tried to shut down a free speech conference, “because apparently they missed irony class that day.” He recalled the Yale student who was videotaped screaming at a professor, Nicholas Christakis, that he had failed “to create a place of comfort and home” for students in his capacity as the head of a residential college.

A rally at New Haven Superior Court demanding justice for Corey Menafee, an African-American dining hall worker at Yale’s Calhoun College who was charged with breaking a window pane that depicted black slaves carrying cotton. Credit Peter Hvizdak/New Haven Register, via Associated Press

“I don’t think anything has damaged Yale’s brand quite like that,” said Mr. Johnston, a founder of an internet start-up and a former hedge fund manager. “This is not your daddy’s liberalism.”

“The worst part,” he continued, “is that campus administrators are wilting before the activists like flowers.” Yale College’s alumni fund was flat between this year and last, according to Karen Peart, a university spokeswoman.

#### Endowments are key to education quality

ACE 14 ["Understanding College and University Endowments," American Council on Education, 2014] AZ

An endowment is an aggregation of assets invested by a college or university to support its educational mission in perpetuity. An institution’s endowment actually comprises hundreds or thousands of individual endowments. An endowment allows donors to transfer their private dollars to public purposes with the assurance that their gifts will serve these purposes for as long as the institution continues to exist. An endowment represents a compact between a donor and an institution. It links past, current, and future generations. It also allows an institution to make commitments far into the future, knowing that resources to meet those commitments will continue to be available. Endowments serve institutions and the public by: • Providing stability. College and university revenues fluctuate over time with changes in enrollment (tuition), donor interest (gifts), and public (largely state and federal) support. Although endowment earnings also vary with changes in financial markets and investment strategies, most institutions follow prudent guidelines (spending rates) to buffer economic fluctuations that are intended to produce a relatively stable stream of income. Since endowment principal is not spent, the interest generated by endowment earnings supports institutional priorities year after year. This kind of stability is especially important for activities that cannot readily be started and stopped, or for which fluctuating levels of support could be costly or debilitating. Endowments frequently support student aid, faculty positions, innovative academic programs, medical research, and libraries. • Leveraging other sources of revenue. In recent years, as the economy has been severely stressed, institutions have dramatically increased their own student aid expenditures, and endowments have enabled institutions to respond more fully to changing demographics and families’ financial need. It is not surprising that the colleges and universities with the largest endowments are also the ones most likely to offer needblind admission (admitting students without regard to financial circumstances and then providing enough financial aid to enable those admitted to attend). An endowment also allows a college or university to provide a higher level of quality or service at a lower price than would otherwise be possible. This has been especially important in recent years, particularly for publicly supported institutions that have experienced significant cuts in state support. Without endowments or other private gifts, institutions would have had to cut back even further on their programs, levy even greater increases in their prices to students, and/or obtain additional public funding to maintain current programs at current prices. Encouraging innovation and flexibility. An endowment enables faculty and students to conduct innovative research, explore new academic fields, apply new technologies, and develop new teaching methods even if funding is not readily available from other sources, including tuition, gifts, or grants. Such innovation and flexibility has led to entirely new programs and to important discoveries in science, medicine, education, and other fields. • Allowing a longer time horizon. Unlike gifts expended upon receipt, an endowed gift keeps giving over time. Endowed institutions can plan strategically to use a more reliable stream of earnings to strengthen and enhance the quality of their programs, even if many years will be required to achieve some of their goals. By making endowed gifts, alumni and others take responsibility for ensuring the long-term well-being of colleges and universities; their gifts help enable future generations of students to benefit from a higher quality of education and allow these institutions to make even greater contributions to the public good

#### High quality training and research at colleges is key to solve climate change

Snibbe 15 [Kris Snibbe, "Colleges have ‘special’ role in fighting climate change," Harvard Gazette, 3/17/2015] AZ

In an address to faculty and students at Tsinghua University today, Harvard President Drew Faust argued forcefully that universities have a unique and critical role to play in combating climate change. She opened her remarks by recalling her last visit to Tsinghua in 2008. “There is a proverb that the best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago — and the second-best time is now,” Faust told the audience of about 250 Chinese students, faculty, and journalists. “When I first visited Tsinghua seven years ago … I planted a tree with [former Tsinghua] President Gu [Binglin] in the Friendship Garden … I am glad the Tsinghua-Harvard tree stands as a symbol of the many relationships across our two universities, relationships which continue to grow and thrive,” she said. “More than ever, it is as a testament to the possibilities that, by working together, we offer the world. That is why I want to spend a few minutes today talking about the special role universities like ours play in addressing climate change.” Faust’s speech marked the culmination of a series of events in Beijing at which climate change was a central topic. At a gathering of alumni, faculty, and friends on Sunday, she looked on as Ali Malkawi, professor of architectural technology at the Harvard Graduate School of Design (GSD) and founding director of the Harvard Center for Green Buildings and Cities, explained his efforts to reduce the carbon footprint of large human-made structures and systems, from individual buildings to whole cities. On Monday, Faust and Chinese President Xi Jinping, meeting at the Great Hall of the People, discussed governmental and academic efforts to address the threat of climate change. Faust used the opportunity to highlight the important work being undertaken by faculty and students at Harvard and at institutions across the globe such as Tsinghua to develop substantive technological and policy solutions to this global challenge and to urge continued faculty collaborations. “Last November, President Xi and President Obama made a joint announcement on climate change, pledging to limit the greenhouse gas emissions of China and the United States over the next several decades,” Faust said. “It is a landmark accord, setting ambitious goals for the world’s two largest carbon-emitting countries and establishing a marker that presidents Xi and Obama hope will inspire other countries to do the same. “We could not have predicted such a shared commitment seven [years] or even one year ago between these two leaders — both, in fact, our alumni — one a Tsinghua graduate in chemical engineering and the humanities and the other a graduate of Harvard Law School,” she continued. “And yet our two institutions had already sown the seeds of this agreement decades ago by educating leaders who can turn months of discussion into an international milestone, and by collaborating for more than 20 years on the climate analyses that made the agreement possible. In other words, by doing the things universities are uniquely designed to do.” Calling the recent agreement a “defining moment … worthy of celebration,” and giving China credit for building the world’s largest wind-power capacity as well as the second-largest capacity in solar energy, Faust nonetheless said that these efforts represent “only a beginning” of what needs to be done. “Industry, education, agriculture, business, finance, individual citizens — all are necessary participants in what must become an energy and environmental revolution, a new paradigm that will improve public health, care for the planet, and put both of our nations on the path toward a prosperous, low-carbon economy,” she argued. “Universities are especially good at ‘thinking different,’ ” Faust said in her prepared text, quoting an expression often used by Apple founder Steve Jobs. “To every generation falls a daunting task. This is our task: to ‘think different’ about how we inhabit the Earth. Where better to meet this challenge than in Boston and Beijing? How better to meet it than by unlocking and harnessing new knowledge, building political and cultural understanding, promoting dialogue, and sharing solutions? Who better to meet it than you, the most extraordinary students — imaginative, curious, daring. The challenge we face demands three great necessities.” Faust made the case that the three great necessities of creating partnerships, undertaking research, and training students to ask and answer the big questions ultimately will yield substantive solutions to this global challenge.

#### Warming is real, anthropogenic, and causes extinction – default to risk management – costs are inevitable, it’s only a question of magnitude – reducing emissions now is key

Nuccitelli 14 [Dana, MS in Physics from UC Davis and Environmental Scientist at a Private Environmental Consulting Firm in California, March 30, “IPCC Report Warns Of Future Climate Change Risks, But Is Spun By Contrarians,” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2014/mar/31/ipcc-warns-climate-change-risks]

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has just published its latest Working Group II report detailing impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability associated with climate change. The picture it paints with respect to the consequences of continued climate change is rather bleak. For example, the report discusses the risk associated with food insecurity due to more intense droughts, floods, and heat waves in a warmer world, especially for poorer countries. This contradicts the claims of climate contrarians like Matt Ridley, who have tried to claim that rising carbon dioxide levels are good for crops. While rising carbon dioxide levels have led to 'global greening' in past decades and improved agricultural technology has increased crop yields, research has indicated that both of these trends are already beginning to reverse. While plants like carbon dioxide, they don't like heat waves, droughts, and floods. Likewise, economist Richard Tol has argued that farmers can adapt to climate change, but adaptation has its costs and its limits. In fact, the IPCC summary report notes that most studies project a decline in crop yields starting in 2030, even as global food demand continues to rise. The report also discusses risks associated with water insecurity, due for example to shrinking of glaciers that act as key water resources for various regions around the world, and through changing precipitation patterns. As a result of these types of changes, the IPCC also anticipates that violent conflicts like civil wars will become more common. The number of people exposed to river floods is projected to increase with the level of warming over the remainder of the century. Sea-level rise will also cause submergence, flooding, and erosion of coastal regions and low-lying areas. And ocean acidification poses significant risk for marine ecosystems; coral reefs in particular. The general risk of species extinctions rises as the planet warms. More climate change means that suitable climates for species shift. The faster these climate zones shift, the more species will be unable to track and adapt to those changes. "Many species will be unable to track suitable climates under mid- and high-range rates of climate change (i.e., RCP4.5, 6.0, and 8.5) during the 21st century (medium confidence). Lower rates of change (i.e., RCP2.6) will pose fewer problems." The report also estimates that global surface warming of approximately 2°C above current temperatures may lead to global income losses of 0.2 to 2.0 percent. However, "Losses are more likely than not to be greater, rather than smaller, than this range ... few quantitative estimates have been completed for additional warming around 3°C or above." Even in the IPCC's most aggressive greenhouse gas emissions reductions scenario, we only limit global warming to around 1°C above current temperatures. In a business-as-usual scenario, temperatures warm about another 4°C – yet we have difficultly estimating the costs of warming exceeding another 2°C. In other words, failing to curb human-caused global warming poses major risks to the global economy. Nevertheless, there will be a certain amount of climate change that we won't be able to avoid, and the IPCC report notes that adaptation to those changes is also critically important. However, we first need to accept the scientific reality of human-caused climate change in order to plan for what's to come. As a notable counter-example, the state of North Carolina recently introduced a bill that would require state coastal planning to ignore all new scientific research with regards to sea-level rise. Obviously we can't adapt to threats if we deny their existence. However, the IPCC report notes that many governments are already beginning to take steps to adapt to climate change impacts in their regions. The good news is that the IPCC reports that many of these climate risks can be reduced by cutting greenhouse gas emissions and thus avoiding the worst climate change scenarios. The IPCC states with high confidence that risks associated with reduced agricultural yields, water scarcity, inundation of coastal infrastructure from sea-level rise, and adverse impacts from heat waves, floods, and droughts can be reduced by cutting human greenhouse gas emissions. In the end it all boils down to risk management. The stronger our efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the lower the risk of extreme climate impacts. The higher our emissions, the larger climate changes we'll face, which also means more expensive adaptation, more species extinctions, more food and water insecurities, more income losses, more conflicts, and so forth. Contrarians have tried to spin the conclusions of the report to incorrectly argue that it would be cheaper to try and adapt to climate change and pay the costs of climate damages. In reality the report says no such thing. The IPCC simply tells us that even if we manage to prevent the highest risk scenarios, climate change costs will still be high, and we can't even grasp how high climate damage costs will be in the highest risk scenarios. As Chris Field, Co-Chair of Working Group II noted, "With high levels of warming that result from continued growth in greenhouse gas emissions, risks will be challenging to manage, and even serious, sustained investments in adaptation will face limits" We're committed to a certain amount of climate change, and as glaciologist Lonnie Thompson famously put it, "The only question is how much we will mitigate, adapt, and suffer". The latest IPCC report confirms that minimizing adaptation and suffering through risk management by reducing human greenhouse gas emissions is a no-brainer.

### Heg DA

#### Campus activism against war undermines morale and forces withdrawal – collapses American presence abroad and causes massive instability that culminates in extinction

Janet Levy 7 [(Janet Levy, ) Iraq’s only Similarity to Vietnam: Its Dangerous Anti-War Movement, Accuracy in Media 2-28-2007] AT

Contrary to media reports and the perception of a majority of Americans, the United States was winning the war in Vietnam following the successful watershed battle known as the Tet Offensive. Sadly, the Vietnam War was not lost on the battlefield. The carnage and repressive regimes that followed the U.S. exit may have been avoided had the truth been known by the American public. The United States was defeated by a carefully conceived, multi-pronged propaganda campaign that set the stage for America’s eventual failure in the region. The ingredients for the U.S. defeat consisted of the funding and encouragement of the anti-war movement by Hanoi and Communist splinter groups, enlistment of “useful idiots” in Hollywood to publicize and popularize the movement, media complicity with negative portrayals of the war, anti-American proselytizing by professors and students on American university campuses, denigration and demonizing of the military and, ultimately, withdrawal of support and appropriations by the U.S. Congress. All these factors led to the perceptual reframing of the Vietnam War as an ignoble imperialistic atrocity, a far cry from its launch as a fight to extinguish communism in Southeast Asia. Today, many of these same elements have reappeared as the United States struggles to defeat Islamic terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan and to apprehend a fifth column of jihadists at home. Inherited from the Vietnam experience, they are now evident within the new conflict. This time, the risks to our country’s future are even greater should they succeed. Anti-War Groups As was true during the Vietnam War, today’s anti-war groups hide their anti-Americanism behind the politics of peace. Recruiting others on a platform of “peace,” they ally themselves with radical Islamists, glorify the enemy’s goals and identify themselves as “freedom fighters,” battling an imperialistic world power. In the lead up to the war against Iraq, anti-war activists effectively mobilized some of the largest protests and demonstrations since the Vietnam War. They attacked the war effort abroad and security measures at home, sympathized with Saddam Hussein as a victim of American war-mongering and even served as strategically-placed human shields. Although Operation Iraqi Freedom was welcomed by the vast majority of Iraqis and succeeded in liberating 25 million people from the ravages of a murderous despot, anti-war protestors decried the U.S. “occupation” of Iraq and the alleged subjugation of the Iraqi people. Their steadfast position was that any use of American military power was an attempt to establish American hegemony in the region and exploit Iraq’s oil resources. The discovery of Saddam’s mass graves and torture chambers were ignored by the anti-war movement in the service of demonizing the actions of the evil, American empire. Hollywood Similarly, in the tradition of Hanoi Jane Fonda, Hollywood plays a highly visible role in opposing the Iraq war and in spearheading demonstrations. Fonda is back in the anti-war fray as Jihad Jane joined by actors Susan Sarandon, Tim Robbins, Sean Penn and others. Before the invasion by coalition forces, Penn embarked on a “fact finding mission” in Iraq, where he met with Saddam Hussein. In a propaganda coup for the anti-war movement and the Baathists, Penn proclaimed to the media that the United States had initiated the war effort on false and illegitimate premises and declared that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction. Since then, the Hollywood anti-war cabal has threatened the political future of elected representatives unwilling to support the recent, nonbinding resolution against the war. As Hollywood stars use their celebrity in their attempts to sabotage the U.S. war effort, they fail to mention Saddam’s rape rooms, gassing of Kurds and murder of children in front of their parents. These movie stars deny the valiant purpose of the U.S. mission and its committed and brave soldiers. Instead, they give aid, comfort and legitimacy to the enemy. Mass Media As in the Vietnam era, the media has become the propaganda machine for the anti-war movement, using the same tactics of the 1960s and 1970s. The overwhelmingly negative and biased reporting of the Vietnam War era is very much in evidence in today’s Iraq coverage. The press continually advances the notion that life was better for the Iraqis under Saddam, minimizes the atrocities committed by Saddam and his henchman, and focuses instead on the U.S. role in “destabilizing” Iraq. The “good news” about economic recovery, business successes, progress made by the Iraqi government and improvements in public services are ignored in favor of stories of civil strife. Every attack on American soldiers and Iraqis is magnified and featured prominently, while successes are largely ignored or reported in passing. Few news stories focus on the heroism and generosity of American troops. Any hint of malfeasance, allegations of combat errors or misconduct on the part of the U.S. military gets center stage. U.S. forces are portrayed as an enemy as dangerous or even more so, than the terrorist groups they fight. U.S. soldiers are portrayed as acting without regard to the rule of law and abusing the rights of captured “insurgents.” Schools Equally reminiscent of the ’60s and ’70s, university and high school campuses are hotbeds for anti-American and anti-war sentiments. Prior to the inception of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the “Books Not Bombs” strike was coordinated on campuses nationwide by the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition, whose members include the Young Communist League, USA, and the Muslim Students’ Association of the U.S. and Canada. This anti-war protest was endorsed by professors in a wide variety of disciplines, from economics to biology, who cancelled classes or assured anti-war students they would not be penalized for absences. Some professors even focused the day’s class material on the potential war. Thus, a majority of institutions of higher education appeared to expect conformity of anti-war opinion and, in some cases, actually imposed the strike on the student population. This behavior continues today as literature and anthropology professors use classroom time to express their opinions against the war and pressure students to toe their ideological line. Often, students who agree with the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq jeopardize their grades by coming forward. They are treated with disdain and even disrespect in the classroom. Returning Iraq war veterans have been insulted, harassed and called “baby killers” in university classrooms. The Military Finally, as was the case during the U.S. fight against communism in Southeast Asia, the mission of the military has been undermined by blatant hostility and blanket condemnations. Venomous slurs have been directed toward the dedicated servicemen and women who toppled a brutal dictator, struggled against radical Islamists, and fought for a better life for the Iraqi people. Politicians have been extremely negative. For example, Illinois senator Barrack Obama referred to the “wasted” lives of our soldiers. Massachusetts Senator John Kerry insulted the intelligence of our armed forces by proclaiming that people end up in the military if they’re not smart or studious. Anti-military groups have tried to stop military recruitment drives and job fair participation in high schools and on college campuses. Even though all recruits today are committed volunteers who believe in the U.S. mission, anti-war activists portray them as victims, mercenaries or butchers. Isolated military improprieties committed by a few soldiers, like the Haditha incident and the Abu Ghraib scandal, receive outsized attention and are portrayed as representative of all military conduct. The slightest hint of misconduct is used to characterize all recruits and to malign the entire military mission. Anti-militarism has even been expressed by sweeping, local government measures. The city of San Francisco has engaged in various actions to rid itself of any relationship whatsoever to the military. Residents recently passed a symbolic measure demanding the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and prohibiting recruitment at high schools and colleges. City residents tried to stop Navy sponsorship of a summer concert, successfully blocked the docking of the USS Iowa at the Port of San Francisco and are trying to eliminate Fleet Week and the Blue Angels air shows. Congress In Congress, many Democrats and several Republicans are invoking the Vietnam “quagmire” descriptive to support demands to curtail the Iraq war and withdraw U.S. troops. The Democrat electorate has chosen to interpret recent election results as a sign that the public is opposed to the war, rather than opposed to the way the war is being fought. According to a recent national survey by Public Opinion Strategies, a majority of Americans (57%) wants to win the war in Iraq and makes the connection between Iraq and the global jihad. Fifty-three percent feel the Democrats are acting precipitously in pushing for immediate withdrawal and a majority (56%) also believes that Americans should stand behind the president in times of war. Most telling, 74% of those surveyed disagreed with the statement, “I don’t care what happens in Iraq after the U.S. leaves. I just want the troops brought home.” Last week, on the same day that Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki told Bush that the new security plan and heightened troop presence in Baghdad were “a dazzling success,” the House passed a non-binding resolution rejecting Bush’s 21,500-troop surge in Iraq. In the Senate, the resolution was just four votes short of the sixty required for cloture, which would have limited debate on the resolution and ensured passage. As a consequence of this narrow defeat, Democrats have pledged to repeal a 2002 measure authorizing and defining the mission of U.S. troops in Iraq. With no consideration of how this plays with the enemy, the morale of U.S. troops and the U.S. ground troops’ ability to build alliances with Iraqis, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid issued a statement that the invasion of Iraq was “the worst foreign policy mistake” in U.S. history. In further attempts to block the deployment of more troops, House Democrats hope to restrict parts of a $100 billion emergency military funding request by the President. Rep. John Murtha (D-PA) and other Democrats have joined forces with anti-war groups to limit the President’s powers as Commander-In-Chief. Murtha and company plan to attach stipulations to any military appropriations; embark on a multi-million dollar, anti-war advertising campaign; and target vulnerable Republicans. Murtha is also seeking legislation as part of what he calls his “slow bleed strategy.” It would prevent military units from being deployed unless they meet certain standards and receive a break of at least one year between deployments. This damaging action by politicians and their failure to support the U.S. government “destroys morale, stymies success and emboldens the enemy,” says Rep. Sam Johnson (R-TX), a former Vietnam prisoner of war. “Words cannot fully describe the horrendous damage of the anti-American efforts against the war back home to the guys on the ground,” Johnson said. “We must stick by ‘the troops.’ We must support them all the way. To our troops we must remain always faithful.” This inattention to the message being sent to our soldiers is part of the broader failure by Iraq war opponents to recognize the dire consequences of U.S. withdrawal. It completely escapes opponents of the war on all fronts anti-war activists, Hollywood, colleges and universities and politicians that the conflict is not regional and one from which we can walk away without harm. It is positively stunning that they fail to recognize that Iraq could fall to Islamic terrorists. If this happened, Iraq would be a fertile base for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and a haven from which emboldened terrorists could attack U.S. allies and interests and threaten the very existence of our nation.

#### US leadership prevents great power war and existential governance crises

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control

#### Retrenchment green lights revisionist powers — causes nuclear conflict and arms races.

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Revisionist powers are on the move. ‎From eastern Ukraine and the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea, large rivals of the United States are modernizing their military forces, grabbing strategic real estate, and threatening vulnerable U.S. allies. Their goal is not just to assert hegemony over their neighborhoods but to rearrange the global security order as we have known it since the end of the Second World War.

We first wrote about these emerging dynamics in 2010, and then in TAI in 2011. We argued three things. First, that revisionist powers were using a strategy of “probing”: a combination of assertive diplomacy and small but bold military actions to test the outer reaches of American power and in particular the resilience of frontier allies. Second, we argued that the small, exposed allies who were the targets of these probes were likely to respond by developing back-up options to U.S. security guarantees, whether through military self-help or accommodation. And third, we argued that that China and Russia were learning from one another’s probes in their respective regions, and that allies themselves were drawing conclusions about U.S. deterrence in their own neighborhood from how America handled similarly situated allies elsewhere.

Five years later, as we argue in a new book released this month, these dynamics have intensified dramatically. Revisionist powers are indeed probing the United States, but their methods have become bolder, more violent—and successful. Allies have grown more alert to this pressure, amid the steady whittling away of neighboring buffer zones, and have begun to pursue an array of self-help schemes ranging from arms build-ups to flirtations with the nearby revisionist power. It has become harder for the United States to isolate security crises to one region: Russia’s land-grabs in Eastern Europe provide both a model and distraction effect for China to accelerate its maritime claims in the South China Sea; Poland’s quest for U.S. strategic reassurance unnerves and spurs allies in the Persian Gulf and Western Pacific.

By degrees, the world is entering the path to war. Not since the 1980s have the conditions been riper for a major international military crisis. Not since the 1930s has the world witnessed the emergence of multiple large, predatory states determined to revise the global order to their advantage—if necessary by force. At a minimum, the United States in coming years could face the pressure of managing several deteriorating regional security spirals; at a maximum, it could be confronted with a Great Power war against one, and possibly two or even three, nuclear-armed peer competitors. In either case, the U.S. military could face these scenarios without either the presumption of technological overmatch or favorable force ratios that it has enjoyed against its rivals for the past several decades.

How should the United States respond to these dynamics? As our rivals grow more aggressive and our military edge narrows, we must look to other methods for waging and winning geopolitical competitions in the 21st century.

The most readily available but underutilized tool at our disposal is alliances. America’s frontline allies offer a mechanism by which it can contain rivals—indeed, this was the original purpose for cultivating security linkages with small states in the world’s rimland regions to begin with. In coming years, the value of strategically placed allies near Eurasia’s large land powers will grow as our relative technological or numerical military strength shrinks. The time has come for the United States to develop a grand strategy for containing peer competitors centered on the creative use of frontline allies. It must do so now, before geopolitical competition intensifies.

Predatory Peers

Probing has been the strategy of choice for America’s modern rivals to challenge the existing order. Over the past few years, Russia, China, and, to a degree, Iran have sensed that the United States is retreating in their respective regions—whether out of choice, fatigue, weakness, or all three combined. But they are unsure of how much remaining strength the United States has, or of the solidity of its commitments to allies. Rather than risking direct war, they have employed low-intensity crises to test U.S. power in these regions. Like past revisionists, they have focused their probes on seemingly secondary interests of the leading power, either by humbling its weakest allies or seizing gray zones over which the United States is unlikely to fight. These probes test the United States on the outer rim of its influence, where the revisionist’s own interests are strongest while the U.S. is at its furthest commitments and therefore most vulnerable to defeat. Russia has launched a steady sequence of threatening military moves against vulnerable NATO allies and conducted limited offensives against former Soviet satellite states. China has sought out low-intensity diplomatic confrontations with small U.S. security clients, erected military no-go zones, and asserted claims over strategic waterways.

When we wrote about this behavior in The American Interest in 2011, it was composed mainly of aggressive diplomacy or threatening but small military moves. But the probes of U.S. rivals are becoming bolder. Sensing a window of opportunity, in 2014 Russia upped the ante by invading Ukraine—the largest country in Eastern Europe—in a war that has so far cost 7,000 lives and brought 52,000 square kilometers of territory into the Russian sphere of influence. After years of using unmarked fishing trawlers to harass U.S. or allied naval vessels, China has begun to militarize its probes in the South China Sea, constructing seven artificial islands and claiming (and threatening to fight over) 1.8 million square kilometers of ocean. Iran has recently humiliated the United States by holding American naval vessels and broadcasting photos of surrendering U.S. sailors. In all cases, revisionist powers increased the stakes because they perceived their initial probes to have succeeded. Having achieved modest gains, they increased the intensity of their probes.

The strategic significance of these latest probes for the United States is twofold. First, they have substantially increased the military pressure on frontline allies. The presence of a buffer zone of some sort, whether land or sea, between allies like Poland or Japan and neighboring revisionist powers, helped to reduce the odds of sustained contact and confrontation between allied and rival militaries. By successfully encroaching on or invading these middle spaces, revisionists have advanced the zone of contest closer to the territory of U.S. allies, increasing the potential for a deliberate or accidental military clash.

Second, the latest probes have significantly raised the overall pressure on the United States. As long as Russia’s military adventures were restricted to its own southern periphery, America could afford to shift resources to the Pacific without worrying much about the consequences in Europe—an important consideration given the Pentagon’s jettisoning of the goal to be able to fight a two-front war. With both Ukraine and the South China Sea at play (and with a chaotic Middle East, where another rival, Iran, advances its reach and influence), the United States no longer has the luxury of prioritizing one region over another; with two re-militarized frontiers at opposite ends of the globe, it must continually weigh trade-offs in scarce military resources between geographic theaters. This disadvantage is not lost on America’s rivals, or its most exposed friends.

Frontier Frenzy

The intensification of probing has reverberated through the ranks of America’s frontline allies. In both Europe and Asia, the edges of the Western order are inhabited by historically vulnerable small or mid-sized states that over the past seven decades have relied on the United States for their existence. The similarities in the geopolitical position and strategic options of states like Estonia and Taiwan, or Poland and South Korea, are striking. For all of these states, survival depends above all on the sustainability of U.S. extended deterrence, in both its nuclear and conventional forms. This in turn rests on two foundations: the assumption among rivals and allies alike that the United States is physically able to fulfill its security obligations to even the smallest ally, and the assumption that it is politically willing to do so.

Doubts about both have been growing for many years. Reductions in American defense spending are weakening the U.S. military capability to protect allies. Due to cuts introduced by the 2009 Budget Control Act, the U.S. Navy is smaller than at any point since before the First World War, the U.S. Army is smaller than at any point since before the Second World War and the U.S. Air Force has the lowest number of operational warplanes in its history. Nuclear force levels are static or declining, and the U.S. technological edge over rivals in important weapons types has diminished. The Pentagon in 2009 announced that for the first time since the Second World War it would jettison the goal of being able to conduct a two-front global war.

At the same time that U.S. capabilities are decreasing, those of our rivals are increasing. Both Russia and China have undertaken large, multiyear military expansion and modernization programs and the technological gap between them and the United States is narrowing, particularly in key areas such as short-range missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, and fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

Recent American statecraft has compounded the problem by weakening the belief in U.S. political will to defend allies. The early Obama Administration’s public questioning of the value of traditional alliances as “alignments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a long-gone Cold War” shook allied confidence at the same time that its high-profile engagement with large rivals indicated a preference for big-power bargaining over the heads of small states. The U.S.-Russia “reset” seemed to many allies both transactional and freewheeling, and left a lasting impression of the suddenness with which U.S. priorities could shift from one Administration to the next. This undermined the predictability of patronage that is the sine qua non of effective deterrence for any Great Power.

As the revisionists’ probes have become more assertive and U.S. credibility less firm, America’s frontier allies have started to reconsider their national security options. Five years ago, many frontline states expressed security concerns, began to seek greater military capabilities, or looked to offset risk by engaging diplomatically with revisionists. But for the most part, such behavior was muted and well within the bounds of existing alliance commitments. However, as probing has picked up pace, allied coping behavior has become more frantic. In Europe, Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania have initiated military spending increases. In Asia, littoral U.S. allies are engaged in a worrisome regional arms race. In both regions, the largest allies are considering offensive capabilities to create conventional deterrence. Their willingness to build up their indigenous military capabilities is overall a positive development, but it carries risks, too, spurring dynamics that were absent over the past decades. The danger is that, absent a consistent and credible U.S. overwatch, rearming allies engage in a chaotic acquisition strategy, poorly anchored in the larger alliance. Fearing abandonment, such states may end up detaching themselves from the alliance simply by pursuing independent security policies.

There is also danger on the other side of the spectrum of possible responses by frontline allies. Contrary to the hopeful assumptions of offshore balancers, not all frontline allies are resisting. Some are choosing strategies of accommodation. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia in Europe and Thailand and Malaysia in Asia are all examples of nominal U.S. allies that are trying to avoid antagonizing the stronger predator. Worsening regional security dynamics create domestic political pressures to avoid confrontation with the nearby revisionist power. Full-fledged bandwagoning in the form of the establishment of new alliances is not yet visible, but hedging is.

Seeds of Disorder

The combination of intensifying probes and fragmenting alliances threatens to unravel important components of the stability of major regions and the wider international order. Allowed to continue on their current path, security dynamics in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific could lead to negative or even catastrophic outcomes for U.S. national security. One increasingly likely near-term scenario is a simmering, simultaneous security competition in major regions. In such a scenario, rivals continue probing allies and grabbing middle-zone territory while steering clear of war with the United States or its proxies; allies continue making half-measure preparations without becoming fully capable of managing their own security; and the United States continues feeding greater and greater resources into frontline regions without achieving reassurance, doggedly tested and put in doubt by the revisionists. Through a continued series of probes, the revisionist powers maintain the initiative while the United States and its allies play catch up. The result might be a gradual hardening of the U.S. security perimeter that never culminates in a Great Power war but generates many of the negative features of sustained security competition—arms races, proxy wars, and cyber and hybrid conflicts—that erode the bases of global economic growth.

A second, graver possibility is war. Historically, a lengthy series of successful probes has often culminated in a military confrontation. One dangerous characteristic of today’s international landscape is that not one but two revisionists have now completed protracted sequences of probes that, from their perspective, have been successful. If the purpose of probing is to assess the top power’s strength, today’s probes could eventually convince either Russia, China, or both that the time is ripe for a more definitive contest. It is uncertain what the outcome would be. Force ratios in today’s two hotspots, the Baltic Sea and South China Sea, do not favor the United States. Both Russia and China possess significant anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities, with a ten-to-one Russian troop advantage in the Baltic and massive Chinese preponderance of coastal short-range missiles in the South China Sea. Moreover, both powers possess nuclear weapons and, in Russia’s case, a doctrine favoring their escalatory use for strategic effect. And even if the United States can maintain overwhelming military superiority in a dyadic contest, war is always the realm of chance and a source of destruction that threatens the stability of the existing international order. Having failed a series of probes, the United States could face the prospect of either a short, sharp war that culminates in nuclear attack or an economically costly protracted two-front conflict. Either outcome would definitely alter the U.S.-led international system as we know it.

A third, long-term possibility is a gradual eviction of the United States from the rimland regions. This could occur either through a military defeat, as described above, or through the gradual hollowing out of U.S. regional alliances due to the erosion of deterrence and alliance defection—and therefore this scenario is not mutually exclusive of the previous two. For the United States, this would be geopolitically disastrous, involving a loss of position in the places where America must be present to prevent the risk of hemispheric isolation. Gaining a foothold in the Eurasian rimlands has been a major, if not the most important, goal of U.S. grand strategy for a century. It is through this presence that the United States is able to shape global politics and avoid the emergence of mortal threats to itself. Without such a presence, America’s largest rivals would be able to steadily aggrandize, building up enlarged spheres of influence, territory, and resources that would render them capable of sustained competition for global primacy. Unlike in the 20th century, current A2AD and nuclear technology would make a military reentry into these regions difficult if not impossible.

### Heg DA—Deterrence IL

#### The perception of resolve is a greater predictor of how war starts than any other factor – China prioritizes it over capabilities

**Mastro 15**-an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, 21 Jan 2015, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27434/uploads)//SL> **italics in original**

These efforts are commendable—the United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But China is currently testing the waters not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of *resolve*. This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia.

China’s strategists are betting that the side with the strongest military does not necessarily win the war—the foundation of the deterrent pillar of its A2/AD strategy. Indeed, China’s experience in fighting the Korean War proves that a country willing to sacrifice blood and treasure can overcome a technologically superior opponent. The belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it. Canned demonstrations of U.S. power fail to address the fundamental uncertainty concerning U.S. willingness, not ability, to fight.

The U.S. focus on de-escalation in all situations only exacerbates this issue. The Cold War experience solidified the Western narrative stemming from World War I that inadvertent escalation causes major war, and therefore crisis management is the key to maintaining peace.74 This has created a situation in which the main U.S. goal has been de-escalation in each crisis or incident with Beijing. But Chinese leaders do not share this mindset—they believe leaders deliberately control the escalation process and therefore wars happen because leaders decide at a given juncture that the best option is to fight.75 China is masterful at chipping away at U.S. credibility through advancing militarization and coercive diplomacy. It often uses limited military action to credibly signal its willingness to escalate if its demands are not met. Strategist Thomas Schelling theoretically captured this approach when he wrote it is “the sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under control … that can intimidate the enemy.”76

Because China introduces risk for exactly this reason, the U.S. focus on deescalation through crisis management is unlikely to produce any change in Chinese behavior—if anything it will only encourage greater provocations. Beijing has identified the U.S. fear of inadvertent escalation, and is exploiting it to compel the United States to give in to its demands and preferences. In this way, the U.S. focus on de-escalation may actually be the source of instability by rewarding and encouraging further Chinese provocations. To signal to China that the United States will not opt out of a conflict, Washington must signal willingness to escalate to higher levels of conflict when China is directly and purposely testing U.S. resolve. This may include reducing channels of communication during a conflict, or involving additional regional actors, to credibly demonstrate that China will not be able to use asymmetry of resolve to its advantage.

The current mindset—that crisis management is the answer in all scenarios— will be difficult to dislodge, given the tendency among U.S. military ranks to focus on worst-case “great battle” scenarios. While realistic in Cold War operational planning, decision makers should consider instead the less violent and prolonged engagements that characterize Chinese coercive diplomacy when evaluating risk and reward, such as the 1962 Sino–Indian War or the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands. The idea that any conflict with China would escalate to a major war, destroy the global economy, and perhaps even escalate to a nuclear exchange has no foundation in Chinese thinking, and causes the United States to concede in even the smallest encounters. While the Chinese leadership has proven to be more risk-acceptant than the United States (or perhaps more accurately, to assess the risks to be less than those perceived by U.S. strategists), Xi still wants to avoid an armed conflict at this stage. In his November 2014 keynote address at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, he noted that China remains in a period of strategic opportunity in which efforts should be made to maintain the benign strategic environment so as to focus on internal development.77

Ultimately, the U.S. regional objective must be peace and stability at an acceptable cost. Given this, it is critical to understand the four components of China’s A2/AD strategy, the strategic foundation for China’s recent assertiveness, and how best to maintain the U.S. position as a Pacific power. In addition to regularly attending meetings in the region and developing new technology, new platforms, and new operational concepts designed to defeat China’s A2/AD strategy, the United States needs to break free of its Cold War-based paradigm paralysis and rethink conceptions of limited war, escalation, and risk.

Scolding China and imposing symbolic costs for each maritime incident is unlikely to inspire the corrective change U.S. thinkers are hoping for. The United States needs to fundamentally change its approach by accepting higher risk and allowing for the possibility of escalation—both vertically in force as well as horizontally to include other countries. This admittedly is a difficult balance, especially given the need to avoid emboldening U.S. allies to take actions that run contrary to U.S. interests. But only by mastering these two balancing acts—focusing on balancing resolve, rather than forces, and prioritizing stability over crisis management—will the United States be able to maintain peace and stability in East Asia without sacrificing U.S. or allied interests.

### Navy Impact

#### US Naval power is key to maintain the seas as a geopolitical shock absorber – ensures conflicts stay limited, prevents terrorism, and fosters global coop that solves every conflict – decline would also cause China war

Robert C. Rubel 14, Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, “Navies and Economic Prosperity: The New Logic of Sea Power,” in Writing to Think: The Intellectual Journey of a Naval Career, p.60-68

Systems thinking recognizes the interdependency of the various elements that contribute to a system. If we understand and accept that the world has knitted itself together into a global system of commerce (and the necessary forms of collective security that accompany commerce), then we are prepared to recognize and acknowledge that a wide range of factors impinge upon and even govern the effectiveness and efficiency of each subsystem. Using this logic we can easily understand not only that resource extraction, manufacturing, consumption and transportation are inextricably integrated elements of the world economy, but also that the protection of one to the exclusion of the others is not rational. The system as a whole must be protected. While it is true that no single military service—or nation—has the capability to render holistic systemic protection it is also true that the effects of each one’s operations ripple throughout the system as a whole, either enhancing or diminishing its overall security.¶ For navies, then, it is not sufficient to think of their purpose only in terms of protecting shipping. Certainly, shipping must be protected, but if there is nothing to put in those ships, their transits, safe or not, are meaningless. Therefore, it is as important that manufacturing nodes and resource nodes be similarly protected and that efforts be made to protect and enhance the nations and societies that constitute these nodes, not to mention the nations and societies that consume their output. Thus we have an endto- end systemic-view of what we might call the “mission space” of navies. The better the system works—the more secure it is—the better the world’s prospects for economic prosperity. It does not work for just one nation. For the purposes of this discussion, the important point is that the flow of finance, goods, information, etc. must be sustained across the system. The flow can be interrupted by disrupting shipping (and air travel and the internet), but commercial shipping, at least, is not significantly threatened in today’s world. On the other hand, war among major powers, instability in resource areas and major terrorist attacks in consumption areas all could significantly disrupt the flow, with disastrous results for the world economy as well as international peace. Given the dependency of most pension plans on the growth in the value of securities, it is not inaccurate to say that the well-being of much of the world’s greying population is dependent upon the effective functioning of navies.¶ Having established the systemic context for the new syllogism, we can engage in some reductionism to sort out some individual factors that can help us identify particular naval capabilities that are needed, their magnitude and even their mode of application (strategy). In doing so, we will focus, naturally, on threats to the system, proceeding from the most to the least dire.¶ As intimated previously, war among major powers is potentially the most disruptive threat to the global system. When one considers the almost eighty-year global system “dark age” between the outbreak of the First World War and the end of the Cold War, the impact of major power war becomes obvious. It would be arrogant and facile to suggest that navies themselves can prevent such wars, but it should be noted that a naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany played no small part in the chain of events leading to 1914 and the perceived vulnerability of the U.S. fleet in Hawaii was a factor in the Japanese decision to attack in 1941. These two themes, naval arms races and perceived naval vulnerability, constitute factors that have continuing relevance in today’s systemic world.¶ Let us start with naval arms races. We must admit that nations build navies for a range of reasons beyond protection of merchant shipping. These may include the desire to protect a vulnerable coast line, deter depredations by other powers and even generate prestige. There is, perhaps, one element of Mahan’s syllogism that continues to be true: at a certain level of economic activity and wealth, nations start building navies. A capable, ocean-going navy is a sign that a nation has “arrived” as a major power. Whether such navy building is a herald of future war or is a politically neutral phenomenon is not clear, although the historical record is cause for concern. Today, China, Japan, India, Brazil and other nations are building navies. They each have their reasons, but the prospects that such building programmes will lead to suspicion, alarm, fear and ultimately war may depend very much on how the current leading navies and their parent nations proceed.¶ An important reason the world system has been able to stitch itself back together after the world wars is the military superiority of the United States. A liberal democratic trading nation, it has coupled this superiority with free trade policies to stimulate economic growth. Capital, goods and people can flow freely around the globe, generating systemic behaviour. A key element of American military superiority is command of the seas, a term denoting the inability of any other navy to impose a strategic defeat on the U.S. Navy on the high seas. It is this command, like that achieved by the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century, which helped create the necessary conditions for system formation. When it is lost, as it was in 1914 and 1941, the world fragments and falls into war.¶ The challenge becomes how to use command of the sea to manage or influence the emergence of other navies such that true naval arms races do not occur. The right way to do this is not completely clear but there appear to be several sure-fire losing strategies. The first is for the United States to start the arms race itself by reflexively viewing the emergence of the Chinese Navy or others as a threat. Policies and patterns of building and deployment based on alarm and fear will generate reciprocal responses in China and elsewhere. This is why CS21 does not mention China or any other nation by name, something often criticized by those with an alarmist bent. Among the ways the U.S. Navy can stimulate Chinese alarm is to openly consider interdiction of their seaborne commerce in exercises, war games or articles. Not only would this strengthen the hand of Chinese alarmists, but commerce interdiction would probably be infeasible on a number of counts anyway. Another good way to invoke this kind of reciprocal security dilemma is to link sea control and power projection. After the Cold War, the U.S. Navy focused so narrowly on power projection that it and some of its allied navies forgot how to talk about sea control.12 While progress has been made in this area, there is still a sense in the doctrine that U.S. forces will use land strikes to neutralize shore based antiaccess systems with sea control being an exercise in access generation that is prerequisite to projecting power ashore.13 One can imagine the effect such talk has on a nation like China that has suffered humiliation and exploitation from the sea at the hands of western nations. Already, the Chinese are reacting to the most recent U.S. concept of this ilk, Air-Sea Battle: “If the U.S. military develops Air-Sea Battle to deal with the [People’s Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to develop anti-Air-Sea Battle.”14¶ A second way to increase the odds that navy building will lead to war is for the leading navies to allow vulnerabilities to emerge. The U.S. Navy did this in two ways during the 1930s and up to 1941. First, it was slow to recognize and accept that the bomb-carrying aircraft had replaced the major calibre gun as the dominant naval weapon. Although war games at the Naval War College and demonstrations by Billy Mitchell provided clear indicators, it took the December 1941 disasters of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales to force the new reality on the admirals. Today, the new reality is that the anti-ship missile is the arbiter of what floats and what does not. This is a condition that has existed since the early 1970s but has not been compellingly revealed due to the lack of an all-out naval battle, just as there was no all-out naval battle between 1922 and 1941 to reveal the bomb’s superiority. Vulnerability can also be generated by concentration. In 1941 the bulk of the U.S. fleet was concentrated at Pearl Harbor, leading Admiral Yamamoto to think that a single knock-out blow was possible. Although today the U.S. Navy is strategically dispersed around the world, its principal combat power is concentrated into eleven aircraft carriers. Taking several of these out would seriously compromise the strategic capabilities of the U.S. Navy, not to mention the potential adverse effects of derailing U.S. policy as happened via the loss of eighteen Special Forces soldiers in Somalia, or conversely stimulating escalation, possibly to the nuclear level. Moreover, a hit on a nuclear carrier that killed hundreds, if not thousands, of U.S. sailors in a single blow might easily generate national outrage and serve to escalate the conflict far above initial intentions. In naval warfare, history has shown that the tactical offense has most often trumped the tactical defence, and thinking that aircraft carriers can be defended against the array of existing and potential anti-ship missiles is not much different than the outlook of battleship admirals in the fall of 1941.15¶ The combination of vulnerability issues suggests that the U.S. Navy and any allied or cooperating navies that seek to constitute a combat credible force in ocean zones threatened by anti-ship missiles will have to disaggregate their power into a dispersed grid of submarines, destroyers and unmanned vehicles, themselves armed with highly lethal anti-ship missiles. Their purpose should be clearly articulated as defending the system by deterring aggression via the sea by means of defeating—at sea—any attempt to do so. Even the best anti-ship missile cannot hit what cannot be found. By disaggregating naval combat power and equipping it to exert sea control—at sea—we thereby eliminate both forms of naval vulnerability that contribute to naval arms races, and the deterioration of deterrence.¶ There is one other vulnerability issue that must be considered, and that is positioning. If caught out of position when a crisis erupts, the reactive movements of naval forces can catalyse rather than deter military action. In 1982, during the crisis leading up to the Falklands War, fears that the British were gathering up naval forces to send south helped put the Argentine Junta in a now-or-never state of mind, which precipitated their invasion and the war.16 If catalysis is to be avoided, naval forces must maintain a persistent presence in such areas where deterrence is necessary. This is why CS21 prescribes concentrated, credible combat forces be stationed forward in East Asia and the Persian Gulf. The Navy’s inventory of ships, aircraft and other systems must be sufficiently large such that this presence can be maintained indefinitely without “using up” ships and sailors at an unsustainable rate.¶ If command of the seas is achieved and maintained wisely by not provoking alarm and not allowing naval vulnerabilities to occur, the seas can constitute a massive geopolitical shock absorber, preventing conflicts in one area of the world from spilling over into others, mainly by keeping hostile armies from moving by sea, and allowing one’s own to do so. Even though this condition holds today as a function of American command of the sea, there has emerged, since the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the prospect of terrorists and their weapons being smuggled by sea to the shores of America, Europe, China, Japan and other developed countries. Given the disruptive potential of terrorist attacks, it is reasonable to regard them as only a step down from major power war as a threat to the system. Although the attacks of 9/11 were perpetrated by the radical Islamic organization al Qaeda, in the future such strikes might be staged by any number of groups. Although neutralization of such organizations by intelligence or law enforcement agencies is the preferred method, the lack of success to date in doing so for narco-traffickers and other criminal enterprises leaves us to consider at-sea interdiction as a necessary measure.¶ The seas, of course, are huge, and at any moment they are dotted with tens of thousands of ships. There is not now nor has there ever been a navy of sufficient size to hermetically seal off the seas to smugglers. The only way to make the seas a barrier to terrorists is to have every costal nation effectively guard its own waters and establish good teamwork between its navy, intelligence service and law enforcement agencies. Some nations do but many do not. Thus CS21 calls for building capacity in those developing nations whose navies or coast guards are embryonic.¶ The mission of capacity building requires a very different kind of naval force than the one needed to prevent major power war. The main “weapon system” of such a force is the sailors and other personnel that train, educate and influence those in developing countries that will become sailors. The sheer number of countries needing such assistance suggests these missions be conducted from relatively inexpensive ships that can be procured in some numbers. In addition to actual naval forces deployed for capacity building purposes, the navies of developed nations employ their shore training and education infrastructures. The importance of naval academies and war colleges in building not only capacity but relationships cannot be overstated.¶ Beyond capacity building, making the seas a barrier to terrorists requires information about who is at sea, what is in the containers and holds, and where they are. Not only are new forms of surveillance needed, but also intensive information sharing so that two and two can be put together to reveal suspicious activity. To manage this, the U.S. Navy is developing a global network of maritime operations centres that will develop regional pictures that will be shared globally. This, in turn requires an international effort to develop trust and confidence so that information flows freely.¶ If an adequate degree of maritime security can be achieved, the seas will constitute a geopolitical shock absorber in another way. In the wake of 9/11 the United States had no equivalent of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Lord St Vincent, who supposedly advised a jittery parliament in 1801, “I do not say my lords that the French will not come, I say only that they will not come by sea.” Without the assurance of the seas as a barrier to further attack, it was as if New York City was connected to Kabul and Baghdad by a land bridge. The Bush Administration was spooked by the prospect of a WMD attack and rather stampeded itself into two simultaneous Eurasian land wars that got the United States mired down and over-extended. The comfort of insulating oceans can provide, among other things, a certain poise to the deliberations of the National Security Council and time for cooling off and reflection before committing the nation to war. Moreover, in the wake of the pull-out from Iraq and an increasingly rapid drawdown in Afghanistan, both the current and former U.S. Chiefs of Naval Operations have advanced the notion of an “offshore option” for anchoring forward U.S. military capabilities in the future.17 This would increase the proportionate contribution of naval forces to the U.S. effort to maintain global stability.¶ The threat of terrorism emanates principally from an area of a world that has been variously referred to as the “arc of instability” and Barnett’s Non-Integrating Gap. It encompasses much of Africa and the Middle East as well as parts of Southeast Asia. It is where most failed states exist but also where much of the natural resources necessary for the world economy are found. Thus the nations that constitute the global economic system can ill afford a hands-off strategy of containment, hoping to seal off the area against the spread of terrorism until it heals itself. Therapeutic incisions have been and will continue to be necessary at various times and places.¶ Because of the undeveloped nature of this area of the world, along with the fact that most of its inhabitants live within several hundred miles of the coast, naval force projection capability from a sea base will be necessary. The early phases of the Afghanistan operations were of this nature and we can confidently expect that if and when the world’s developed nations reach a consensus about going into Somalia to cure the piracy problem, it will be a sea-based expeditionary operation. Thus, protection of resource areas will require that some number of navies possess substantial sea-based expeditionary force capability, preferably of a kind that can integrate multi-national contributions easily. Rendering disaster relief, as was done in the tsunami relief effort in 2004, the Haiti earthquake and the Japan tsunami, is also an important form of sea-based force projection that mitigates economic damage to the system. It is likely that future sea-based expeditionary operations will be international, and so that capability must be conceptualized and practiced.¶ The mere presence of naval forces in areas of the world that are the source of resources, notably oil, seems to have a beneficial economic effect. Both routine presence of naval forces and their responses in crises were shown to have a substantial economic benefit in a 1997 study by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.18 It found that the initial naval response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is likely to have increased global GDP by over $86 billion.19 Perhaps the least dire threat to the global system is piracy —albeit one that is currently seizing the headlines. Somali pirates, a manifestation of a failed state in the Non-Integrating Gap, hijack merchants and demand ransom for the crew and ship. The actual chance of a particular merchant being hijacked is less than one in nine hundred,20 and shipping companies seem more inclined to pay the ransom than install armed guards aboard their ships. However, the publicity has galvanized nations and their navies to take action. A previous bout of piracy in the Straits of Malacca was cured by the joint action of local navies. The Somalia/Gulf of Aden situation is more problematic since there is no effective governmental authority ashore. However, the emerging world response to it reveals some important facets of an emerging global naval infrastructure that supports the global system of commerce and security.¶ In Mahan’s day, the movement of major naval forces was noted by many countries, sometimes with alarm, as it might presage invasion, or at least a round of coercive diplomacy. In fact, when the PRC announced it was dispatching a small squadron to the Gulf of Aden, there was alarm in some quarters in the United States and other countries that this was a sign of an expansionist China. The Chinese themselves announced that their ships would operate independently in the Gulf of Aden to protect their own merchants. However, after several weeks on station two things happened: the alarm about their movement died off and the Chinese commander suggested a cooperative zone defence in order to make most efficient use of the international naval forces on station. Moreover, not only the Chinese are there, but the Russians, NATO, EU (different task force), the Japanese, Koreans, Singaporeans and even the “rogue” nation of Iran. Everybody is cooperating—why, how and what does it mean?¶ To start with, we must acknowledge the uniqueness of the Gulf of Aden situation. Somalia is a failed state that possesses neither resources nor location that would incite major power rivalry over influence ashore there. There is a universal confluence of interests centred on the protection of shipping. The unusual absence of major power competition allows naval operations to follow their natural course and provide a unique opportunity for us to see the security side of the global system in action.¶ The Chinese, Russians, Iranians and other naval forces have become virtually invisible in the Gulf of Aden because they have fallen in on an existing framework and infrastructure of sea power that girdles the globe. This infrastructure (perhaps more accurately the maritime security subsystem of the global economic system) consists of both physical and intangible elements. On the physical side, there is the U.S. Navy’s world-wide logistics system. It operates 24/7/365 and is composed of a web of bases, husbanding (victuals) contracts and replenishment ships, augmented by the supply ships of the Royal Navy, Japan and other allies. This system can support international naval operations anywhere in the world. In addition, there are GPS and communication satellites as well as the ubiquitous internet. Among the intangibles are the UN Law of the Sea that provides a clear framework for who can do what in whose waters, any number of other international agreements governing a range of maritime issues, and a world conditioned to see U.S. Navy and allied ships cruising the littorals of Eurasia. Perhaps another intangible element is CS21 itself, which casts the United States and its navy in a defensive posture (defence of the global system). This makes it easier politically for other nations to deploy their ships on a cooperative mission and make use of the U.S. Navy’s logistics system. It also appears that the navies of the world are getting comfortable with looser coordination arrangements. Before the internet, strict communications, protocols, and structured command and control schemes were necessary. With the internet, everyone can talk more extensively and in new ways such that restrictive command arrangements are not so necessary. This in turn obviates the need for formal agreements prior to conducting cooperative operations. With the political and technical barriers to entry low, nations become more willing to send their navies on cooperative ventures.¶ Previously we discussed the seas as geopolitical shock absorbers, both to limit other nations’ options for aggression and to provide our own government time for reflection and preserving the option of doing nothing. In the cooperative naval operations off Somalia, we see another aspect of the phenomenon emerging in a very positive way. It turns out that ships from the Chinese, Japanese and South Korean navies have taken to operating together in the Gulf of Aden. Strange bedfellows indeed, but as both the Japanese navy’s operations chief and a Chinese maritime scholar have said to the author on different occasions, cooperating on easier missions can build trust and confidence that will provide a basis for achieving resolution of more difficult maritime issues between the nations. This is indeed geopolitical shock absorbing of the most congenial kind.¶ We have now arrived at a point where we can put all of the elements of modern naval endeavour together in a new syllogism. Navies protect their nations’ economic prospects by operating cooperatively to defend all elements of the global system of commerce and security. Their necessary functions range from averting naval arms races to rendering disaster relief to, yes, protecting shipping. But it is not an every navy for itself process; the more cooperation, the better. It may even turn out that sustained and habitual international naval cooperation will someday make the concept of command of the sea irrelevant. Until then, the U.S. Navy must exert careful stewardship over its command of the sea, keep its global logistics system robust and develop the capacity to catalyse a global maritime security partnership on a broad front by being in a lot of places at the same time. Other navies must also look at the world in systems terms if they are to most effectively develop utility arguments and determine how to most effectively target their limited resources.¶ If one accepts the arguments that underpin the new syllogism of how navies support economic prosperity, then reasons for optimism become clear. Naval building programmes in China, India and elsewhere do not have to lead to war as has happened in the past in Europe; there is a reasonable prospect that the seas can be denied to terrorists; the seas can be used to bring the Non-Integrating Gap into the system; and the emerging pattern of naval cooperating can not only secure the seas but reduce the likelihood of conflict and war.¶ None of this will happen if nations let their navies decay. The unique thing about navies is that their optimum utility is in time of peace. When sea power is hitting on all cylinders, it is invisible. An investment in sea power is most appropriate and effective at a point when threats are not apparent. In Mahan’s day the syllogism of sea power focused on the sovereign interests of individual nations and its application led eventually to war.¶ Today we see the world as a system, with a sea power logic that is expressed in systems terms. Its application, that is, investment in navies structured along systemic lines, promises a massive return in the form of an extended and improving peace and—despite the current global economic woes—prosperity.

### CASE

### Framing [Extinction]

#### Reducing the risk of extinction by a tiny amount outweighs massive structural violence.

**Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.  Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. [http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf](http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.pdf)]Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the   possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential  catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**.  **This implies that the expected value of  reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the   value of a million human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10  54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10  52  lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even   more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a   technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected   value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth   a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an   expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct   benefit of saving 1 billion lives.**  And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1  billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost   certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

#### Death outweighs – loss of value to life is subjective and always reversible. Don't consign people to death because the aff thinks they have no value – preserve the possibility of future happiness

### A2 Trump Kills Heg

#### **Trump's foreign policy shores up American hegemony – fears are overblown**

Jakobsen 17 [Peter Jakobsen (Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College and Professor at the Center for War Studies at University of Southern Denmark), "DOOMSDAY CANCELLED: TRUMP IS GOOD NEWS FOR ALLIES AND WORLD PEACE," 3/2/2017] AZ

The election of Donald Trump as U.S. president has rocked the U.S. security establishment and its allies around the world. President Trump has questioned the security guarantees that underpin the Pax Americana in speeches, personal conversations with world leaders, and – of course – on Twitter. He has claimed that allies are “ripping the United States off,” dismissed NATO for being “obsolete,” and mused that the time may have come for Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons. He insists that U.S. allies have to pay and do more for their defense. Many in the United States and abroad have decried these statements as destabilizing and dangerous; The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists captured the general mood by moving their doomsday clock 30 seconds closer to midnight in response to Trump’s inauguration. This concern is massively overblown. Rather than weakening America’s web of alliances, Trump’s aggressive statements and erratic behavior will most likely strengthen the American-led security architecture during his presidency. This is good news for world peace because strong American alliances and strong American allies can deter rivals from launching destabilizing challenges to the predominant order. Trump’s aggressive communications strategy and his “America First” approach to international negotiations have already frightened allies into doing something his predecessors could not: increase defense spending. Fear of abandonment has changed the nature of the defense debate in allied capitals in Asia and Europe. The question is no longer whether defense spending should increase, but how much. U.S. allies in Europe are now scrambling to produce concrete plans for how they will increase defense spending in time for President Trump’s first visit to NATO in late May 2017.. His perceived unpredictability is also making military provocations and risk-taking by America’s adversaries less likely. Trumpology is Misleading The concern triggered by Trump’s election stems in no small part from the rise of what I call “Trumpology” – the incessant scrutiny of Trump’s personality, his statements, and his tweets. Trumpology is a new growth industry and the media embraces it because it fits their definition of a newsworthy story perfectly. Trump’s communications generate all the criteria journalists look for in a good story: conflict, anxiety, comedy, theater, and outrage. This helps media companies, even those attacked by Trump, sell advertising like hotcakes. Many experts now spend their time putting Trump’s words under the microscope, seeking to identify all the disasters they might create. In addition, psychologists have been busy analyzing his personality and upbringing in order to explain why he is acting so weird. The American intelligence community has used personality profiling since World War II to better understand how leaders in closed authoritarian systems such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Russia think and act. The results have been useful on occasion, but the study of personalities and intentions is insufficient with respect to predicting foreign policy actions and outcomes. One must also analyze the consequences and the opposition that proposed actions are likely to generate. If one considers the consequences of undermining existing U.S. alliances and how much opposition such action would trigger, one gets a far more positive picture of Trump’s impact on world security than the doomsday scenarios that Trumpologists have mass-produced since his election. Consequences for U.S. Allies Since the late 1940s, U.S. allies in Europe and Asia have based their national security on the assumption that the United States will assist them in a crisis. This assumption and the post-Cold War downsizing of Europe’s military forces have rendered Europeans incapable of conducting even relatively small-scale military operations without substantial American support. NATO’s air war against Libya (2011) and the French intervention in Mali (2013) are two recent cases in point. Neither operation would have been possible without American logistics, lift, munitions, intelligence, and other forms of support. The situation in the same in Asia: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have all based their defense forces and defense spending on the assumption that the U.S. cavalry will come to their rescue if necessary. If Trump degrades or withdraws these security guarantees, the allies will face a stark choice between deterrence and appeasement. In Europe deterrence is the most likely choice because the big three (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) are strong enough to constitute the core of a new alliance that can credibly deter Russia. In Asia, China will become so strong that most states bordering the East China Sea will have no choice but to appease Beijing and accept its hegemony. Regardless of the outcome, both Europe and Asia would face a period characterized by high instability and a heightened risk of war. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would seek to develop nuclear weapons. In Europe, Germany and Poland would have a strong incentive to do the same unless France and Britain extend their nuclear umbrellas over them. Indeed, all of these countries, except Poland, either contemplated the development of nuclear weapons (Germany and Japan) or had active nuclear weapons programs during the Cold War (South Korea and Taiwan). Consequences for the United States Prominent American scholars such as John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Stephen Walt have long recommended that the United States withdraw most of its forces from Asia and Europe because the costs of the existing onshore presence dwarf the benefits. In their view, the existing security guarantees amount to “welfare for the rich” and increase the risk of entrapment in wars that do not involve American national interests. They believe that the United States would be much better off by copying the offshore balancing strategy that the British Empire employed in Europe before World War II. This would involve providing support to shifting alliances and coalitions in order to prevent a single power from establishing a regional hegemony on the European continent. Offshore balancing has clear limitations and did not serve the British well in the end: it threw them into two world wars that brought the empire to its knees. Britain’s fate highlights the weakness of offshore balancing: a loss of the ability to shape the security politics onshore decisively. The failure of British offshore balancing dragged the United States into both world wars. America’s decisions to help its allies in Europe defeat Germany proved costly in blood and treasure. Since then the United States has benefitted tremendously from the onshore balancing strategy it adopted after World War II in both Asia and Europe, where it stationed its forces permanently to deter aggression. This presence, coupled with the allies’ military dependence, enabled Washington to shape development in both regions to align with U.S. interests. Washington repeatedly gave their allies offers they could not refuse. U.S. economic assistance programs provided to allies in the wake of World War II came with conditions that forced the recipients to buy American goods and liberalize their markets in ways that were highly beneficial to American firms. Washington forced Great Britain and France to withdraw their troops from Egypt during the Suez Crisis (1956), coerced Germany to support U.S. monetary policy (1966 to 1969), and leaned on many allies to stop their nuclear weapons programs and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) that made such weapons illegal, including Japan, Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan. Military dependence on the United States also induced many allies to support U.S.-led wars in faraway places that did not affect their national security directly. The Afghan War and Iraq War are two recent cases in point. The allies closed their eyes to issues like secret detention and extraordinary rendition programs, the use of torture, and the massive surveillance of their own citizens that has characterized the War on Terror since 9/11. Allies have given the United States access to bases, facilities, as well as their airspace and territorial waters. This facilitates U.S. power projection globally. Finally, many allies buy American weapon systems as a way of maintain inter-operability and their security guarantees. The F-35 is the latest and greatest example of this. The consequences of a U.S. military withdrawal from Europe and Asia would be dramatic. The United States would lose most of its military bases in Asia and Europe, American firms would find it much harder to gain access to Asian and European markets, the American defense industry would lose billions of dollars, and European allies would stop supporting the United States militarily in faraway conflicts. As a result, the United States would lose its global power status and be reduced to a regional power with limited say in the management of Asian and European security. This is why it will not happen. This outcome is not only at odds with America’s economic interests, but it is also completely at odds with the widely shared belief in American exceptionalism and greatness. This is a belief that Trump and his supporters also embrace. Most Americans continue to view their nation as the greatest power on earth with an obligation to lead and make the world safe for America’s universal values. Trump is Scaring Allies into Spending But if the costs of abandoning allies are prohibitive, why is Trump threatening to do so? Nobel Prize laureate Thomas Schelling’s work on game theory suggests an answer. Schelling demonstrated in his seminal Strategy of Conflict (1960) that it may be advantageous to appear mad or unpredictable, because it may induce your negotiating partners or opponents to give greater concessions that they otherwise would. In this perspective, Trump’s statements and seemingly erratic behavior make a lot of sense as a negotiation tactic aimed at pressuring U.S. allies to increase their defense spending. Trump’s predecessors in the White House have tried to do this for years without success; previous administrations have repeatedly warned its European allies that NATO was in danger of becoming irrelevant if the Europeans continued to cut their defense spending. Yet most European allies paid scant attention to demands from the Obama administration to stop freeriding and honor their own commitments to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. Few European governments saw a pressing need to increase defense spending because the Obama administration reacted to the Russian annexation of the Crimea by enhancing its military presence in Europe. Trump has changed the game completely. In line with Schelling’s expectations, his perceived unpredictability is adding credibility to the threat that he might actually withdraw U.S. forces even if it is not in the United States best interest to do so. There is genuine concern among U.S. allies about what Trump might do if they do not take immediate steps to increase their defense spending. Many have already taken steps in this direction, or signaled their intention to do so. In December 2016, Japan adopted a record high defense budget, which allocated considerable funds to the procurement of American equipment, notably F-35s and missiles. The South Korean government reacted to Trump’s election by vowing to increase defense spending significantly if he insists on it. Likewise, the Danish Prime Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen promised to increase defense spending after his first phone conversation with Trump. In Germany Trump’s election triggered a hitherto unthinkable debate on whether Germany should develop nuclear weapons. Trump cannot take sole credit for the newfound allied attentiveness to longstanding U.S. demands. The Japanese defense budget has been increasing in recent years due to growing concerns about China. Russia has had a similar effect on the defense budgets of the eastern NATO members. However, Trump has made a crucial difference by completely changing the debate on defense spending in allied capitals, significantly strengthening the hands of the proponents of increased defense spending in allied governments. The 2016 IHS Jane’s Defence Budgets Report consequently expects European NATO allies and partners such as Finland and Sweden to boost their defense spending by about $10 billion over the next five years. Trump’s Unpredictability Deters Rival Risk-Taking That Schelling’s logic applies equally well to President Trump’s dealings with America’s opponents has already been pointed out by other commentators. They have referred to Nixon’s madman theory of negotiation, which holds that America’s opponents will tread more carefully if they perceive the president to be unpredictable or crazy. It has been debated at some length whether Trump is using this theory in a rational manner to extract concessions from U.S. adversaries, or if he is “a madman in practice.” Regardless, the point is that President Trump’s unpredictability makes it next to impossible to calculate the risk of escalation involved in challenging the United States militarily, a concept also highlighted by Schelling. President Obama’s reluctance to threaten and use force likely emboldened China and Russia to take greater military risks in Eastern Ukraine, Syria, and in the East and South China Seas. While Beijing and Moscow could be fairly confident that Obama would not take military counter-measures, they have no way of knowing what President Trump might do. It is very easy to imagine him giving the order to down a Chinese or Russian plane to demonstrate that “America is great again.” In this way, Trump (intentionally or not) reduces the risk of military confrontations with China and Russia. This gives both states greater incentive to prioritize diplomacy over coercion in their efforts to settle disputes with the United States and its allies. Similarly, Trump’s characterization of the nuclear agreement with Iran as “the worst deal ever negotiated” gives Tehran strong incentive to honor it in both letter and spirit for fear of a potentially much worse alternative if it collapses. Some are deeply worried that Trump versus Kim Jong-un will prove a highly explosive combination, which is understandable since North Korea has employing the same negotiating tactics as Trump for decades with considerable success. While the outcome of this confrontation is difficult to call, the disastrous consequences of war are likely to lead to mutual restraint. Moreover, concern about what Trump might do will induce Beijing to redouble its efforts to persuade Pyongyang to be less provocative. Good News for World Peace Paradoxically, Trump’s tweets and the theatrics are most likely to enhance world peace. They create unpredictability and anxiety that the United States can use to obtain greater concessions from friends and foes. It is admittedly still early days, but all indications are that Trump will succeed in coercing his allies in both Asia and Europe to increase their defense spending significantly. Few of them will reach 2 percent of GDP in the next year or two, but he has set in motion a process that will make most allies spend far more much faster than they otherwise would have. His unpredictability is also an asset in America’s dealings with its opponents such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. They will all need to think twice about provoking the United States and its allies militarily because they have no way of calculating how President Trump will react. Neither friends nor foes can be certain that Trump will not do something that a rational cost-benefit calculating actor would not. U.S. allies used to regard American threats to withdraw its forces as bluff because the costs of doing so would be prohibitive, and the same logic has induced American opponents to engage in military risk-taking with little fear of U.S. military retaliation. With Trump in the White House, this logic no longer applies. This is good news because the likely result is strengthened U.S. alliances and U.S. opponents that are more likely to favor negotiation over provocation in their efforts to settle differences with the United States and its allies.

### A2 Oppression

#### Heg decreases structural violence

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First the absurdity: A few of the most over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did indeed promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty concept today. But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ Meanwhile, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be. So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the "evil" of the Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, and their record on economic development was painfully transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- after millennia of mere sustenance. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but the historical sequence is undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s after the Soviet threat disappeared. It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements, including al-Qaida, but we made the effort because, in our heart of hearts, we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of the War on Terror is that its operational requirements actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era.¶ But, of course, that can all be tossed into the dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China, whose growing strength upsets us so much, then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come. ¶ As always, the choice is ours.

### A2 Threat Con

#### Threats real – threat inflation would get our authors fired

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The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more parochial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### A2 Epistemology

#### We’ve impact turned militarism – it’s not a flawed way of thinking if it’s actually good

#### Counter-bias – their epistemology’s *more* flawed. Excess *fear of surveillance* means Aff scholarship’s MORE of an exaggeration than ours.

McDonough ‘15

(Shannon McDonough – Instructor in Social Sciences at Allen University. The author holds a B.A. in Sociology from Miami University, Ohio and an M.A. Sociology from The University of South Carolina. This article is co-authored by Mathieu Deflem – a Professor at the University of South Carolina in the Department of Sociology. His research areas include law, policing, terrorism, popular culture, and sociological theory. “The Fear of Counterterrorism: Surveillance and Civil Liberties Since 9/11” – From the Journal: Society - February 2015, Volume 52, Issue 1, pp 70-79 – obtained via the Springer database collection).

Civil liberties organizations as well as a number of academic scholars have routinely criticized post-9/11 counterterrorism initiatives as unconstitutional and major threats to civil liberties and privacy. Harmonizing with the claims from civil liberties groups are contributions in the popular and scholarly discourse on surveillance and counterterrorism that lament the purported negative impact of governmental policies and related surveillance and intelligence activities on personal rights and liberties. The revelations by former security contractor Edward Snowden in June 2013 concerning alleged spying practices by the National Security Agency (NSA) greatly reinvigorated these debates. We investigate here if there is any counter-evidence to the alarmist statements that are often made in the popular and scholarly discourse on civil liberties and surveillance. Against the background of academic scholarship on surveillance and criticisms from civil liberty and privacy groups, we rely on archival sources, government documents, and media reports to examine a variety of claims made concerning civil liberties violations by security agencies. Our analysis reveals that at least a sizeable number of claims raised against counterterrorism practices are without objective foundation in terms of any actual violations. As an explanation for this marked discrepancy, we suggest that, as various survey data show, there is a relatively distinct, albeit it uneven and not entirely stable, culture of privacy and civil liberties in contemporary American society which independently contributes to a fear of counterterrorism, rather than of terrorism. These specific cultural sensitivities bring about an increase in the amount of civil rights allegations independent of actual violations thereof.

#### Prefer our evidence – the desire for status is grounded in multiple empirical theories and means deterrence is necessary

Wohlforth 9 William, professor of government at Dartmouth College, “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

### A2 Solvency

#### CX proves – they have no clear definition of what "military criticism" means – colleges can't enforce the plan and means no solvency

#### The aff isn't inherent – colleges already lack restrictions on criticism of the military – West Point, the university run by the military, reads Wilderson in debate and criticize the military – obviously if they can criticize the military, all students can

### A2 Interventionism

#### Intervention is inevitable – the aff forces a shift to weaker and bloodier forms of force

Robert Kagan 11 is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. "The Price of Power" Jan 24 Vol 16 No18 www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3

In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. ¶ Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present¶ That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. ¶ The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit. ¶ Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.¶ To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure. ¶ Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. ¶ So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. ¶ Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. ¶ Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? ¶ Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?¶ Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate?¶ The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.

#### Isolationism sanctions genocide

Willis 95 (Ellen, Professor of Journalism & Director of Concentraion in Cultural Reporting and Criticism at NYU, The Village Voice, 12-19-95)

If intellectuals are more inclined to rise to the discrete domestic issue than the historic international moment, this may have less to do with the decay of the notion of international solidarity than with the decay of confidence in their ability to change the world, not to mention the decay of anything resembling a coherent framework of ideas within which to understand it. Certainly the received ideas of the left, to the extent that a left can still be said to exist, have been less than helpful as a framework for understanding the Bosnian crisis or organizing a response to it. Although the idea of American imperialism explains less and less in a world where the locus of power is rapidly shifting to a network of transnational corporations, it still fuels a strain of reflexive anti-interventionist sentiment whose practical result is paralyzed dithering in the face of genocide. Floating around "progressive" circles and reinforcing the dithering is a brand of vulgar pacifism whose defining characteristic is not principled rejection of violence but squeamish aversion to dealing with it. In the academy in particular, entrenched assumptions about identity politics and cultural relativism promote a view of the Balkan conflict as too complicated and ambiguous to allow for choosing sides. If there is no such thing as universality, if multiethnic democracy is not intrinsically preferable to ethnic separatism, if there are no clear-cut aggressors and victims but merely clashing cultures, perhaps ethnic partition is simply the most practical way of resolving those "implacable ancient rivalries."

### A2 Endless War

#### No risk of endless warfare

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. **In the hands of a paranoid**or boundlessly ambitious **political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from**excessive **folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraq**i **experiences reveal clearly that** although **the conduct of war is** an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is **disciplined by public attitudes**. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But**we ought not to endorse the argument** that **the U**nited **S**tates **should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that** the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. **Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means.**This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that **the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government**. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy**, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic.**

### A2 Chilling Effect

#### Informal policies after the aff lack the clarity of definitive speech codes – turns chilling effect

Juhan 12 S. Cagle Juhan (Judicial Law Clerk, Western District of Virginia; JD University of Virginia School of Law). “Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Hostile Speech Environment.” Virginia Law Review. November 2012

Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University) 70 illustrates the problem with **a discretionary system: government bureaucrats serve as roving commissioners, picking and choosing which speech to regulate,** often on the grounds that certain groups object to it. The danger is threefold. First, **the absence of a written policy leaves a vacuum.** By their very nature, **decisions made on a case-by-case basis lack debated, agreed-upon, and dis-seminated principles that can guide action**.’ Thus, one cannot ex ante abide by guidelines that are unknowable until after one speaks. **The result is the commonly cited “chilling effect”: speakers will say less, even if their speech would be constitutionally pro-tected, because they cannot be assured that they will not be pun-ished for** it.‘ **Second, informal, standardless decision-making processes about what speech should be allowed** are viewed with particular skepti-cism in First Amendment doctrine because they both **contribute to the chilling effect and enhance the risk of discriminatory or arbi-trary regulation**.’ **Ad hoc judgments allow universities to sanction speech** because they disapprove of it, which is precisely the out-come that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.‘The third and related concern is that **administrators are easily captured by campus constituencies that mobilize against hateful or merely unpopular speech**.’ The Iota Xi case offers a clear example of this problem. Students objecting to the fraternity’s speech convinced an administrator that the speech created a hostile educational environment and conflicted with the university’s mission; administrators subsequently imposed sanctions, despite not having done so in an initial meeting with the fraternity that occurred the same day as the one with the offended students. The risk of “captured” administrators is especially high when hate speech is at issue.’ Hate speech frequently targets minorities or historically disfavored groups. These constituencies, in addition to understandably disagreeing with hate speech that disparages them, are some of the most vocal proponents and defenders of the equality, diversity, and tolerance norms that have gained incredible purchase in the realm of higher education. Accusations or percep-tions that a university or its administrators are not sympathetic enough to these norms or to the groups invoking them can have adverse consequences for a university’s prestige and an administra- tor’s career.’ Therefore, **there are strong personal and institutional incentives** to err on the side of equality, diversity, and tolerance ideals and against constitutionally protected speech.‘ One observer has aptly termed **ad hoc decision-making processes “implicit speech codes**.” ’ Ultimately, however, whether ex-plicit or implicit, speech codes increase (1) the chilling effect on speech, (2) the danger of viewpoint discrimination, and (3) the op-portunity for constituencies to suppress opponents by capturing administrators.’

### A2 Engelhardt (Lynbrook)

#### They’re wrong about China – China is aggressive

Erickson, 2013, PhD, associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center (Andrew, “Deterrence by Denial: How to Prevent China From Using Force”, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/war-china-two-can-play-the-area-denial-game-9564>)

In contrast to ongoing limitations, shared interests, and even opportunities for increasingly-robust cooperation far away, China’s navy and other services are achieving formidable [4]anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) [4] capabilities closer to shore. Beijing is prioritizing an “anti-Navy [5]” to deter U.S. intervention in the Western Pacific over a blue-water, power-projection navy. The Chinese have identified, and are exploiting, limitations in U.S. weapons systems that stem from fundamental physical principles. For example, quiet diesel submarines will always be difficult to detect, track and kill. Fixed targets like airbases will always be difficult to defend against ballistic missiles. Beijing seeks to wield this growing might to pursue outstanding territorial and maritime claims and to [6]carve out [6]in the Yellow, East and South China Seas and airspace above them a “zone of exceptionalism” within which existing global security, legal, and resource management norms are subordinated to its parochial national interests. This can only weaken the global system on which all nations’ security and prosperity depends, and will continue to destabilize a vital but vulnerable region that remains haunted by history. If not addressed properly, China’s rise as a major A2/AD military power could give it unprecedented capacity to deny sanctuary and communications to U.S. forces, and thereby challenge the type of military operations for which the U.S. has equipped and prepared. While the Soviet Union posed significant challenges to the U.S. Army and Air Force based in continental Europe in the Cold War, the precision-weapons revolution and the maritime geography of the Asia-Pacific theater enable Chinese A2/AD to render U.S. forces, largely naval and island-based air forces, far more vulnerable. While conflict with China should be avoided, China must also be prevented from significantly coercing its neighbors or unilaterally altering the region’s status quo in ways that are inimical to the interests of the U.S. and its allies, as well as to regional stability in general. Failure to emphasize this point as well risks making the U.S. appear weak and acquiescent to mounting Chinese assertiveness, both to Beijing and to regional allies, friends, and partners. This risks miscalculation on Beijing’s part. It also makes taxpayers and their representatives question why significant U.S. military investments are needed in a time of austerity. This should be framed in terms of ensuring the continued functioning of the existing international system. Washington should clarify, as necessary, that it is not trying to contain Beijing per se, but rather to resist any Chinese actions that would harm the existing system. Conversely, positive Chinese behavior—such as providing international public security goods in the Gulfs of [7]Aden [7] or [8]Guinea [8], or helping to stabilize the North Korean border if the [9]barbaric Kim Jong-un regime [9] collapses, should be encouraged and applauded.

#### Unipolarity is sustainable – military and nuclear deterrence ensure it and no impact to economic challengers

Monteiro, Yale Political Science Professor, 11

[Nuno P., April 25, 2011, “Balancing Act: Why Unipolarity May Be Durable,” <http://irworkshop.sites.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Monteiro_IRW.pdf>, p. 24-25, accessed 7/6/13, WD]

Debate on unipolar durability has generated great controversy, placing it at the center of scholarship on unipolarity. This prominent place stems from two factors driving scholarly concerns. First, having failed to predict the end of the Cold War -- arguably the most momentous transformation of the international system since the emergence of IR as a scientific discipline in the post-WWII years -- IR scholars are determined to “get it right” next time. 69 Second, systemic theory has always placed a great emphasis on balance-of-power mechanisms, creating an expectation that unipolarity (a systemic imbalance of power) would last only briefly until other great powers (re)emerged. Accordingly, a durable unipolar system poses a serious theoretical challenge, emphasizing the importance of the durability question. 70 In response to this challenge, two views have emerged. Declinists predict the inevitable, nay, impending end of our unipolar world. Primacists argue that, on the contrary, US-led unipolarity is here to stay. In this paper, I make three central claims. First, I argue that neither declinists nor primacists -- both of which focus on latent, economic power -- are looking at the right variable to predict the durability of a unipolar world. Unipolarity is a description of the balance of military, not economic power. For as long as the US military remains unchallenged, the world will remain unipolar regardless of the relative size of the US economy. Second, I argue that the distribution of military power is independent from the distribution of economic power. In other words, balancing will only result in a change in the systemic balance of power when the latter is required to guarantee state survival. That is the case in a conventional world. But in a nuclear world, possession of a small but robust nuclear arsenal virtually guarantees survival. Therefore, rising economic powers may, in a nuclear world, achieve the primary goal of balancing short of effecting a systemic balance of power. This means that, in a nuclear world, unipolarity is in principle durable. Third, I argue that whether rising economic powers in a nuclear world will continue to balance past the point at which their survival is ensured by a robust nuclear deterrent depends on the strategy of the unipole towards their economic growth. If the unipole accommodates their economic growth, rising powers have no incentive to continue balancing past that point, making unipolarity durable. If, however, the unipole takes actions that contain their economic growth, then rising powers have an incentive to continue balancing, ultimately leading to the end of a unipolar world. My theory thus draws attention to the logical separation between theories of balancing and balance-of-power theories. The goals of balancing may successfully be achieved without any transformations in the systemic balance of power. Such is the case in a nuclear unipolar world. While states will balance against a unipolar power regardless of its strategy by acquiring survivable nuclear arsenals, the fact that they can guarantee their survival by doing so frees them from the need to pursue a shift in the systemic balance of power in order to guarantee this aim. This argument has important policy implications. First of all, it gives the unipole significant agency in determining the durability of a unipolar world. Rather than being at the mercy of differential rates of economic growth, a unipole in a nuclear world is fully in control of whether its military power preponderance lasts. Its policies vis-à-vis major powers’ economic growth thus acquire a central place in the toolkit with which it manages the systemic balance of military power. Second, my argument suggests that unipolarity presents particular incentives for nuclear proliferation. But, as Robert Jervis has noted, the spread of nuclear weapons -- the nuclear revolution -- brings with it a decreased salience for the systemic balance of power. For a nuclear power, the systemic balance of power no longer necessarily determines its chances of survival. On the transformational character of proliferation in a unipolar world, Jervis writes: This raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. How they would use this increased security is far from clear, however. They might intensify conflict with neighbors because they no longer fear all-out war, or, on the contrary, they might be willing to engage in greater co-operation because the risks of becoming dependent on others would be reduced. In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important. Unipolarity -- at least under current circumstances -- may then have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification, and the resulting world would pose interesting challenges to both scholars and national leaders. 71 More broadly, my theory highlights what is perhaps the key dilemma faced by a unipolar power. It may attempt to contain the economic growth of other states, thus remaining the most powerful state in terms of latent power, but triggering a balancing effort that may ultimately undermine its preeminence in military power. Or it may accommodate other states’ economic growth, thus avoiding a military challenge and maintaining its preeminence in military power, but eventually losing its place as the most powerful economy in the system. In other words, military unipolarity is durable only at the expense of economic hegemony.

## 2NR Materials

### WHISTLEBLOWERS CP

### Sufficiency Framing

#### View counterplan solvency not as a yes/no question, but as a sliding scale – as long as whistle-blowing solves most of militarism, then a risk of the net benefit would outweigh any solvency deficit. The aff solvency is already nebulous and doesn't quantify just how much free speech is needed to solve militarism – hold the CP to the same standard.

### Solves the Case

#### The counterplan resolves all of the case – whistleblowing produces transparent information that promotes social reform and changes to governmental overreach of power – that changes the overall structure of militarism by allowing citizens to challenge over-glorification of the military. That accesses the same internal link as the aff – open information that promotes an exchange of ideas and a culture of discussion rather than a culture of uniform groupthink.

#### Empirics prove – whistleblowing prompts state change in order to stop I law violations

Fuller ‘14

Dr. Roslyn Fuller, lecturer in international law at the National University of Ireland, Spring 2014, “A Matter of National Security: Whistleblowing in the Military as a Mechanism for International Law Enforcement,” San Diego International Law Journal, 15 San Diego Int'l L.J. 249, AJX

¶ In 2013, National Security Agency (NSA) analyst Edward Snowden publicly revealed the existence of the NSA and ¶ Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) mass surveillance programmes PRISM, XKeyscore, and Tempora. The ¶ documents leaked by Snowden detail a range of covert 1\*2581 surveillance activity, including: numerous hacks into the ¶ communications of foreign heads of state, often conducted from US or allied embassies; n40 the mass, warrantless surveillance ¶ of millions of private citizens; 1141 and bugging operations conducted within international organizations and the premises of ¶ foreign representations. 1142 These actions constitute violations of Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and ¶ Political Rights, n43 the sovereignty of the affected states, and, in some cases, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. ¶ 1144 Despite their obvious illegality, these breaches were conducted over a lengthy period of time without becoming subject to ¶ internal corrective action. Since the breaches have become public, this situation has changed dramatically. 1\*2591 A major coalition partner within the German Government, the Social Democrats (SPD), has demanded that the ¶ Bundestag investigate the evidence released by Snowden, while Spain's public prosecutor launched a preliminary inquiry ¶ after news emerged that the NSA had intercepted over 60 million phone calls in Spain over the course of just one month. 1146 ¶ The European Parliament has voted in favour Of investigating the surveillance activities of the United States on European ¶ citizens and has condemned NSA spying on its representations. n47 Moreover, in Mexico a legislative commission has called ¶ for internal investigation into the nation's standards of data protection, 1148 while Brazil has been prompted to change its data ¶ protection laws. n49 Upon the initiative of Germany and Brazil, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution aimed at ¶ protecting privacy in the digital age on December 1 8, 2013. nS1 Although the wording of the resolution omitted the original ¶ intent that mass surveillance explicitly be characterized as a human rights violation, it does clarify that the idea of privacy is ¶ not obsolete in the digital age and that, to the contrary, citizens continue to enjoy the same privacy rights online as they do ¶ offline. ¶ Action has also been taken in the United States itself: the Senate has announced its intention to launch an investigation of ¶ all secret service 1\*2601 programmes, while the government is considering allowing amicus curiae to be filed at the ¶ Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and creating an independent review panel - steps intended to halt more intensive ¶ surveillance on private persons where there are not sufficient grounds to believe they pose a threat to national security. ¶ n5S ¶ President Barack Obama has also ordered NSA spying at the UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank to be ¶ curtailed or halted, despite the fact that spying operations at those institutions - presumably of the offices of national ¶ representatives - had not been made public. 1156 This indicates that such leaks can prompt pre-emptive compliance as states fear ¶ the consequences of as-yet-undiscovered violations. Perhaps most significantly, Snowden's revelations have enabled citizens ¶ in the United States to bring lawsuits against government officials and telecommunications companies implicated in ¶ conducting mass surveillance on American citizens residing in the United States. nS7 ¶ The information revealed by Edward Snowden has prompted both modest corrective behaviour on the part of the United ¶ States that is particularly focused on bringing itself back into compliance with international law in the form of the Vienna ¶ Convention on Diplomatic Relations, as well as robust action on the part of other states to prevent such violations against their ¶ own citizens in future. Thus, even if the perpetrator state is unwilling to substantially alter its conduct, norms of international ¶ law can be enforced by enabling other states to take protective action on the basis of the leaked information. This also holds ¶ true when those states have previously been complicit in violations against their own citizens. States are not monolithic ¶ entities and international law violations may be perpetrated by a small group of individuals or state organs, especially where ¶ appropriate oversight is lacking. In these 1\*2611 cases, revealing this complicity may enable other state organs to take ¶ corrective action. ¶ Of course, not all cases of external whistleblowing result in such clear-cut repercussions - the precise impact of the ¶ information revealed by Katharine Gun or Anat Kamm remains, by its very nature, more difficult to assess. This difficulty, ¶ however, is symptomatic of most methods of law enforcement and does not negate the fact that external whistleblowing can ¶ play an important role in encouraging international law compliance, if not necessarily producing quantitatively measurable ¶ results in every instance. Furthermore, the identity of the states concerned is also a factor in responsiveness to all forms of ¶ whistleblowing. Some states and governments may be more sensitive to allegations of international law violations and more ¶ willing to investigate and take corrective action, while other states may show more resistance under the same or similar ¶ circumstances. The point remains that external whistleblowing can increase the level of state commitment to enforcing ¶ international law to the benefit of those affected by the violations in a direct and traceable fashion as demonstrated by the ¶ above examples.

### Solves Environment

#### Whistleblo**wers are necessary to help enforce environmental laws – key to effective implementation and prevention of environmental collapse**

Warren 15

(Christopher K. Warren, Senior Note Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2014-2015, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 40 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 195, “Blowing The Whistle On Environmental Law: How Congress Can Help The Epa Enlist Private Resources In The Fight To Save The Planet,” pg lexis//um-ef)

CONCLUSION The threats posed by climate change and environmental degradation are real and can only be overcome with high level cooperation amongst those governments, institutions, and individuals with the power to incite change. In this respect, the enforcement mechanism for environmental statutory laws must exhaust all possible options and resources to ensure that the rules and regulations to protect environmental standards are upheld. It is highly doubtful that this can be done relying solely on public resources. Instead, significant contributions from private parties--such as whistleblowers--are likely required to ensure the environmental legal system is working properly, and thus protecting human health and the environment.

#### Governmental regulations aren’t enough – whistleblowers provide an essential check to ensure environmental enforcement

Becker 14

(Emily, J.D. cum laude, Harvard Law School, “Calling Foul: Deficiencies in Approaches to Environmental Whistleblowers and Suggested Reforms,” 6 Wash. & Lee J. Energy, Climate & Env’t. 65pg online @ <http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=jece> //um-ef)

Though regulating any industry is difficult, regulating the environmental industry poses unique challenges.55 Whistleblowers are important in all sectors, but whistleblowers play a crucial role in the environmental sector.56 Though all whistleblowers face obstacles, there is a particular subset of challenges that many whistleblowers in the environmental sector must face.57 This subsection explains: (1) the challenges of regulating the environmental sector,58 (2) the potential for whistleblowers to increase compliance with environmental regulations,59 and (3) the unique difficulties environmental whistleblowers face.60 1. Challenges of Regulating the Environmental Sector The environmental sector is difficult to regulate because: (1) environmental dangers can be hard to monitor; 61 (2) enforcement of environmental regulations tends to be costly and is often dependent upon industry self-reporting; 62 (3) regulated entities often have a financial incentive not to comply with environmental laws; 63 and (4) environmental harm is timesensitive and difficult to reverse.64 Part of this difficulty enforcing environmental regulations comes from the very nature of environmental harms, which tend to be hard to detect and trace back to their source.65 Another challenge comes from the fact that emission levels may vary over space and time.66 A further challenge comes from the fact that many small polluters that are individually difficult to monitor can collectively pose a very real threat.67 These difficulties make environmental controls highly technical, posing another challenge: Regulators must have expertise and access to hightech tools to establish effective pollution regulation controls based on the type of pollutant. 68 Because of the challenges of enforcing environmental regulations, government-regulated monitoring efforts are expensive.69 In an effort to reduce the cost of enforcement, some regulatory approaches, such as subsidies, deposit-refunded systems, and information disclosure, shift the burden of proof onto the regulated industry.70 Though less costly, these approaches make regulators dependent on industry self-reporting and create the potential for an industry to misreport its pollutant levels.71 The potential that self-reported data will be misreported or that industries will subvert official monitoring by engaging in illegal practices, such as tampering with monitoring equipment or dumping illegally, poses a serious threat because industries often profit from noncompliance.72 Under the theory of efficient breach, companies may be willing to break environmental laws where noncompliance is less costly than compliance because regulations go under-enforced.73 Not only are environmental harms hard to monitor, costly to regulate, and susceptible to “efficient breach,” environmental harms are also time-sensitive.74 Indeed, environmental harms jeopardize public health, and the longer harms continue, the greater health risk these harms pose. 75 Moreover, it is usually far easier to prevent an environmental harm than to clean up after one; some environmental harms are effectively irreversible.76 Thus, regulators often need to act quickly to be effective. 2. Whistleblowers Can Facilitate Regulation of the Environmental Sector Whistleblowers can help regulators overcome the aforementioned challenges. First, whistleblowers that work as employees of regulated industries have the technical skills and knowledge that make them effective internal monitors.77 Moreover, whistleblowers increase compliance with little or no additional cost to the taxpayer because they are private citizens rather than official monitors.78 By increasing “the likelihood that polluters will be penalized,” 79 whistleblowers can quell the danger of efficient breach by helping to ensure that noncompliance is more costly than compliance.80 Finally, internal whistleblowers often learn of violations as they are happening and can act quickly to contain or even prevent a time-sensitive environmental harm.81 Likewise, whistleblowers in the media can write a quick article that alerts community members of potential threats before regulators have time to act.82 In these ways, environmental whistleblowers have the potential to increase compliance with environmental laws. 3. Challenges Faced by Environmental Whistleblowers Despite the need for whistleblowers in the environmental sector and the financial savings they can provide, several features of the environmental sector make being an whistleblower especially challenging.83 One problem is that most definitions of who is considered a “whistleblower” cover only individuals who report on traditional types of misconduct, such as waste, fraud, abuse of authority, and actions that pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.84 However, potential environmental whistleblowers often encounter wrongdoing not covered by protective statutes, such as the suppression of results of emissions analyses and the use of skewed methodologies or inferior data.85 Relatedly, because scientific findings can be uncertain and contentious, potential environmental whistleblowers may be unclear as to whether they can or should publish controversial work in journals or newspapers.86 Second, the environmental sector has what is known as a “revolving door” problem, a phrase that describes how individuals often work both as regulators and as employees of regulated industries during their career.87 Though there is a benefit to having experience in both sectors, often “revolving-door officials develop or direct policies that benefit a former or prospective employer.”88 Even those that do not actively attempt to benefit an employer may be unduly cautious in what they are willing to say or do because they are concerned about their job prospects.89 Third, while whistleblowers in other industries may be able to stop wrongdoing by reporting internally, it is much more difficult for environmental whistleblowers to rely on internal reporting alone. This is because unlike other types of wrongdoing, environmental wrongdoing often has adverse effects on third parties and often creates lingering harms. 90 Thus, environmental whistleblowers that report internally may inadvertently enable their employers to avoid compensating third-party victims or to avoid paying the costs of environmental cleanup.91 To ensure that the situation is fully remedied, environmental whistleblowers therefore often need to report externally or otherwise publicize the wrongdoing.92

#### And, they are key to ensure compliance with federal laws

Becker 14

(Emily, J.D. cum laude, Harvard Law School, “Calling Foul: Deficiencies in Approaches to Environmental Whistleblowers and Suggested Reforms,” 6 Wash. & Lee J. Energy, Climate & Env’t. 65pg online @ <http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=jece> //um-ef)

Whatever the whistleblower’s motives for reporting, and society’s view, whistleblowers are absolutely necessary and essential to help protect public interests in this country. In the past, whistleblowers have exposed a multitude of scandals, injustices and illegal activities in the government and in private organizations.30 Furthermore, the government depends on whistleblowers to help enforce public laws.31 Whistleblowers serve as “much needed” supplements to the government’s efforts to gain compliance with the laws.32 The United States has some of the “most stringent environmental laws of all industrialized nations.”33 Despite strict environmental laws, and strict enforcement, there is widespread non-compliance and failed enforcement by government regulators.34 Compliance with environmental laws is essential to “maintain or improve existing living conditions, and benefits public health and safety.”35 Environmental laws are designed to be and sometimes are the only safeguards between society and dangerous pollutants.36 However, environmental laws are not effective when they are not adequately enforced.37 One aspect associated with the difficulty of enforcement of environmental laws is the high cost of uncovering environmental non-compliance and gathering the evidence of noncompliance.38 Employees of organizations are in an excellent position to point out noncompliance. Employees are the most familiar with their workplace and have the most knowledge regarding that what goes on there.39 Congress has found that employees are one of the best sources of information to find out “what a company is actually doing.”40 Whistleblowers often “know more than the best conceived government inspection system.”41 Sometimes, management and governmental authorities, despite having knowledge of the legal standards and operations of the respective organizations, do not know when or how violations are occurring.42 Occasionally, only the employees are actually in a position to report the violations.43 Generally, as reporting increases, compliance with environmental laws increases as well. Reporting is proven to “dramatically increase compliance with the environmental laws.”44 Not only that, the costs of enforcement goes down as well.45 Whistleblowers aid in achieving compliance without requiring any additional public funding.46 Congress has recognized this savings evidenced by the inclusion of whistleblower protection in at least eight of its environmental acts.47

### HEG DA

### Resolve key

#### Err negative – perceptions of resolve have strong empirical support in IR as dissuading conflict

**Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 15 -** \*professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania AND \*\*professor political science at Princeton (Alex and Keren, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics” International Organization 69, Spring 2015, pp. 473–495

Our findings provide strong evidence that reputation for resolve matters. Although studies by reputation critics are correct to argue that realist variables such as power and interests play an important role in states’ behavior during crises, past actions have significant consequences. Countries that have backed down are substantially more likely to face subsequent challenges. We argue that the discrepancy between our results and those advanced by reputation critics may stem from their focus on crisis decision making, where information gleaned from past action will already have been incorporated into broader estimates of interests and hence is less likely to be referenced directly, as well as from their failure to recognize that reputation acts through estimates of an opponent’s interests.

That said, our results do not provide unequivocal support in favor of the strong version of reputation associated with Schelling. Rather, we observe that the effects of past actions remain, but are weaker, when the subsequent interaction less closely resembles the dispute in which the country in question earned its reputation. Thus we find that past actions have a less substantive effect on the probability of a new dispute when the inferences are drawn by observers who were not involved in the previous dispute. We further find that lessons from territorial disputes are much more strongly associated with subsequent territorial challenges than are lessons from nonterritorial disputes. However, we find that reputation for resolve is not leader-specific, indicating that leader turnover in a country with a bad reputation should not significantly lower the probability that such a country will be challenged again.

Important questions about reputation remain. Reputation for resolve exists and is fairly general, but that leaves unanswered questions about the generality of reputation for other traits like honesty and reliability. Separately, although we find little change in reputation after leadership turnover, further research would be needed to definitively establish the degree to which reputations affix to leaders or to states. It is not implausible that both the generality of reputation and the degree to which inferences are drawn about specific leaders or about states in general would vary by regime type or over time.

Our results confirm what leaders already intuitively suspect: reputation for resolve is worth having in international politics. Although backing down is not always the wrong thing to do, leaders who contemplate doing so should be aware of the associated costs.

### A2 Offshore Balancing Good

#### Offshore balancing causes war—and it's not happening now

Jakobsen 17 [Peter Jakobsen (Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College and Professor at the Center for War Studies at University of Southern Denmark), "DOOMSDAY CANCELLED: TRUMP IS GOOD NEWS FOR ALLIES AND WORLD PEACE," 3/2/2017] AZ

Consequences for the United States Prominent American scholars such as John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Stephen Walt have long recommended that the United States withdraw most of its forces from Asia and Europe because the costs of the existing onshore presence dwarf the benefits. In their view, the existing security guarantees amount to “welfare for the rich” and increase the risk of entrapment in wars that do not involve American national interests. They believe that the United States would be much better off by copying the offshore balancing strategy that the British Empire employed in Europe before World War II. This would involve providing support to shifting alliances and coalitions in order to prevent a single power from establishing a regional hegemony on the European continent. Offshore balancing has clear limitations and did not serve the British well in the end: it threw them into two world wars that brought the empire to its knees. Britain’s fate highlights the weakness of offshore balancing: a loss of the ability to shape the security politics onshore decisively. The failure of British offshore balancing dragged the United States into both world wars. America’s decisions to help its allies in Europe defeat Germany proved costly in blood and treasure. Since then the United States has benefitted tremendously from the onshore balancing strategy it adopted after World War II in both Asia and Europe, where it stationed its forces permanently to deter aggression. This presence, coupled with the allies’ military dependence, enabled Washington to shape development in both regions to align with U.S. interests. Washington repeatedly gave their allies offers they could not refuse. U.S. economic assistance programs provided to allies in the wake of World War II came with conditions that forced the recipients to buy American goods and liberalize their markets in ways that were highly beneficial to American firms. Washington forced Great Britain and France to withdraw their troops from Egypt during the Suez Crisis (1956), coerced Germany to support U.S. monetary policy (1966 to 1969), and leaned on many allies to stop their nuclear weapons programs and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) that made such weapons illegal, including Japan, Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan. Military dependence on the United States also induced many allies to support U.S.-led wars in faraway places that did not affect their national security directly. The Afghan War and Iraq War are two recent cases in point. The allies closed their eyes to issues like secret detention and extraordinary rendition programs, the use of torture, and the massive surveillance of their own citizens that has characterized the War on Terror since 9/11. Allies have given the United States access to bases, facilities, as well as their airspace and territorial waters. This facilitates U.S. power projection globally. Finally, many allies buy American weapon systems as a way of maintain inter-operability and their security guarantees. The F-35 is the latest and greatest example of this. The consequences of a U.S. military withdrawal from Europe and Asia would be dramatic. The United States would lose most of its military bases in Asia and Europe, American firms would find it much harder to gain access to Asian and European markets, the American defense industry would lose billions of dollars, and European allies would stop supporting the United States militarily in faraway conflicts. As a result, the United States would lose its global power status and be reduced to a regional power with limited say in the management of Asian and European security. This is why it will not happen. This outcome is not only at odds with America’s economic interests, but it is also completely at odds with the widely shared belief in American exceptionalism and greatness. This is a belief that Trump and his supporters also embrace. Most Americans continue to view their nation as the greatest power on earth with an obligation to lead and make the world safe for America’s universal values.

### A2 Counter-Balancing

#### Balancing arguments false – no meaningful balancing

Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13

[Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, “Lean Forward”, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB]

UNBALANCED

One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own-- or that they will do so in the future.

Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point.

If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback--especially during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms.

### A2 Heg Decline

#### No heg decline

Salvatore Babones 15 [(Salvatore Babones, associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, ) American Hegemony Is Here to Stay, National Interest 6-11-2015] AT

Or so the story goes. In fact, reports of the passing of U.S. hegemony are greatly exaggerated. America’s costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively minor affairs considered in long-term perspective. The strategic challenge posed by China has also been exaggerated. Together with its inner circle of unshakable English-speaking allies, the United States possesses near-total control of the world’s seas, skies, airwaves and cyberspace, while American universities, think tanks and journals dominate the world of ideas. Put aside all the alarmist punditry. American hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come. THE MASSIVE federal deficit, negative credit-agency reports, repeated debt-ceiling crises and the 2013 government shutdown all created the impression that the U.S. government is bankrupt, or close to it. The U.S. economy imports half a trillion dollars a year more than it exports. Among the American population, poverty rates are high and ordinary workers’ wages have been stagnant (in real terms) for decades. Washington seems to be paralyzed by perpetual gridlock. On top of all this, strategic exhaustion after two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has substantially degraded U.S. military capabilities. Then, at the very moment the military needed to regroup, rebuild and rearm, its budget was hit by sequestration. If economic power forms the long-term foundation for political and military power, it would seem that America is in terminal decline. But policy analysts tend to have short memories. Cycles of hegemony run in centuries, not decades (or seasons). When the United Kingdom finally defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, its national resources were completely exhausted. Britain’s public-debt-to-GDP ratio was over 250 percent, and early nineteenth-century governments lacked access to the full range of fiscal and financial tools that are available today. Yet the British Century was only just beginning. The Pax Britannica and the elevation of Queen Victoria to become empress of India were just around the corner. By comparison, America’s current public-debt-to- GDP ratio of less than 80 percent is relatively benign. Those with even a limited historical memory may remember the day in January 2001 when the then chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, testified to the Senate Budget Committee that “if current policies remain in place, the total unified surplus will reach $800 billion in fiscal year 2011. . . . The emerging key fiscal policy need is to address the implications of maintaining surpluses.” As the poet said, bliss was it in that dawn to be alive! Two tax cuts, two wars and one financial crisis later, America’s budget deficit was roughly the size of the projected surplus that so worried Greenspan. This is not to argue that the U.S. government should ramp up taxes and spending, but it does illustrate the fact that it has enormous potential fiscal resources available to it, should it choose to use them. Deficits come and go. America’s fiscal capacity in 2015 is stupendously greater than Great Britain’s was in 1815. Financially, there is every reason to think that America’s century lies in the future, not in the past. The same is true of the supposed exhaustion of the U.S. military. On the one hand, thirteen years of continuous warfare have reduced the readiness of many U.S. combat units, particularly in the army. On the other hand, U.S. troops are now far more experienced in actual combat than the forces of any other major military in the world. In any future conflict, the advantage given by this experience would likely outweigh any decline in effectiveness due to deferred maintenance and training. Constant deployment may place an unpleasant and unfair burden on U.S. service personnel and their families, but it does not necessarily diminish the capability of the U.S. military. On the contrary, it may enhance it. America’s limited wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were hardly the final throes of a passing hegemon. They are more akin to Britain’s bloody but relatively inconsequential conflicts in Afghanistan and Crimea in the middle of the nineteenth century. Brutal wars like these repeatedly punctured, but never burst, British hegemony. In fact, Britain engaged in costly and sometimes disastrous conflicts throughout the century-long Pax Britannica. British hegemony did not come to an end until the country faced Germany head-on in World War I. Even then, Britain ultimately prevailed (with American help). Its empire reached its maximum extent not before World War I but immediately after, in 1922. Ultimately, it is inevitable that in the long run American power will weaken and American hegemony over the rest of the world will fade. But how long is the long run? There are few factual indications that American decline has begun—or that it will begin anytime soon. Short-term fluctuations should not be extrapolated into long-term trends. Without a doubt, 1991 was a moment of supreme U.S. superiority. But so was 1946, after which came the Soviet bomb, Korea and Vietnam. American hegemony has waxed and waned over the last seventy years, but it has never been eclipsed. And it is unlikely that the eclipse is nigh. WHEN PUNDITS scope out the imminent threats to U.S. hegemony, the one country on their radar screens is China. While the former Soviet Union never reached above 45 percent of U.S. total national income, the Chinese economy may already have overtaken the American economy, and if not it certainly will soon. If sheer economic size is the foundation of political and military power, China is positioned for future global hegemony. Will it build on this foundation? Can it? Much depends on the future of China’s relationships with its neighbors. China lives in a tough neighborhood. It faces major middle-tier powers on three sides: Russia to the north, South Korea and Japan to the east, and Vietnam and India to the south. To the west it faces a series of weak and failing states, but that may be more of a burden than a blessing: China’s own western regions are also sites of persistent instability. It is perhaps realistic to imagine China seeking to expand to the north at the expense of Russia and Mongolia. Ethnic Russians are abandoning Siberia and the Pacific coast in droves, and strategic areas along Russia’s border with China have been demographically and economically overwhelmed by Chinese immigration. Twenty-second-century Russia may find it difficult to hold the Far East against China. But that is not a serious threat to U.S. hegemony. If anything, increasing Sino-Russian tensions may reinforce U.S. global hegemony, much as Sino-Soviet tensions did in the 1970s. To the southeast, China clearly seeks to dominate the South China Sea and beyond. The main barrier to its doing so is the autonomy of Taiwan. Were Taiwan ever to be reintegrated with China, it would be difficult for other regional powers to successfully challenge a united China for control of the basin. In the future, it is entirely possible that China will come to dominate these, its own coastal waters. This would be a minor setback to an America accustomed to dominating all of the world’s seas, but it would not constitute a serious strategic threat to the United States. Across the East China Sea, China faces Japan and South Korea—two of the most prosperous, technologically advanced and militarily best-equipped countries in the world. Historical enmities ensure that China will never expand in that direction. Worse for China, it is quite likely that any increase in China’s ability to project power beyond its borders will be matched with similar steps by a wary, remilitarizing Japan. The countries on China’s southern border are so large, populous and poor that it is difficult to imagine China taking much interest in the region beyond simple resource exploitation. Chinese companies may seek profit opportunities in Cambodia, Myanmar and Pakistan, but there is little for China to gain from strategic domination of the region. There will be no Chinese-sponsored Asian equivalent of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Farther abroad, much has been made of China’s strategic engagement in Africa and Latin America. Investment-starved countries in these regions have been eager to access Chinese capital and in many cases have welcomed Chinese investment, expertise and even immigration. But it is hard to imagine them welcoming Chinese military bases, and equally hard to imagine China asking them for bases. The American presence in Africa is in large part the legacy of centuries of European colonialism. China has no such legacy to build on. Above all, however, the prospects for future Chinese hegemony depend on the prospects for future Chinese economic growth. Measured in per capita terms, China is still poorer than Mexico. That China will catch up to Mexico seems certain. That China will continue its extraordinary growth trajectory once it has caught up to Mexico is less obvious. In 2011, when the Chinese economy was growing by more than 10 percent a year, I predicted that China was headed for much slower growth. At the time, the IMF was projecting a long-term growth rate of 9.5 percent. Today, the same IMF projections assume 7 percent growth. Even at 7 percent annual growth, the Chinese economy would account for more than half of total global output by 2050. The United States in its post–World War II heyday never achieved that level of dominance. But exponential extrapolations are inherently tricky. If China continues to grow at 7 percent while the world economy as a whole grows by 3 percent per year, China will account for 90 percent of global economic output by 2100 and 100 percent by 2110. After that, China’s economy will be even larger than the world’s economy, which of course is impossible unless China moves a large portion of its production off-planet. A more reasonable assumption is that China’s economic growth will eventually settle down to global average rates. The only question is when. Existing demographic trends make it almost certain that the answer is: soon. The U.S. Census Bureau has projected that China’s working-age population would reach its peak in 2014 and then go into long-term decline. In the twenty years from 2014 to 2034, China’s working-age population will fall by eighty-seven million, while its elderly population will rise by 149 million. In the language of economic punditry, China will “grow old before it grows rich.” The U.S. population, by contrast, is young and growing. In 2034, the U.S. population is projected to be growing at a rate of 0.6 percent per year (compared to -0.2 percent in China), with substantial immigration of talented, productive people (compared to net emigration from China). The U.S. median age of 39.2 will be significantly younger than the Chinese median age of 44.8. Over the long term these trends may change, but the twenty-year scenario is almost certain, because for the most part it has already happened. Economic trends can turn on a dime, but demographic trends are mostly immutable: tomorrow’s child-bearers have already been born. IN THE ancient Mediterranean world, Rome rose to regional hegemony a century or two after the passing of the Athenian empire. The hegemonic Roman Republic was a hybrid political entity. It consisted of Rome itself, Roman colonies, Roman protectorates, cities conquered by Rome and cities allied to Rome. For four hundred years before 91 BC, the Italian cities allied to Rome were effectively part of the Roman state despite their formal political independence. They participated in Rome’s wars under Roman command. They did not pay taxes or tribute to Rome, but they were fully incorporated into a political system centered on Rome. When Hannibal crossed the Alps in 218 BC, most of the Italian cities did not rise up against Rome as he expected. They stood with Rome because they were effectively part of Rome. In a similar way, the effective borders of the American polity extend well beyond the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. If the Edward Snowden leaks have revealed nothing else, they have shown the depth of intelligence cooperation between the United States and its English-speaking allies Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. These are the so-called Five Eyes countries. These English-speaking allies work so closely with the United States on security issues that they resemble ancient Rome’s Italian allies. Despite their formal political independence, they do not make major strategic decisions without considering America’s interests as well as their own. Curiously, America’s English-speaking allies resemble the United States in their demographic structures as well. While East Asia’s birthrates have fallen well below replacement levels and parts of continental Europe face outright depopulation, the English-speaking countries have stable birthrates and substantial immigration. The most talented people in the world don’t always move to the United States, but more often than not they move to English-speaking countries. It doesn’t hurt that English is the global lingua franca as well as the language of the Internet. One surprising result of these trends is that the once-unfathomable demographic gap between China and the English-speaking world is narrowing. According to U.S. Census Bureau projections, in 2050 the U.S. population will be 399 million and rising by 0.5 percent per year while the Chinese population will be 1.304 billion and falling by 0.5 percent per year. Throw in America’s four English-speaking allies, and the combined five-country population will be 546 million—nearly 42 percent of China’s population—with a growth rate of 0.4 percent per year. No longer will China have the overwhelming demographic advantage that has historically let it punch above its economic weight. Is it reasonable to treat America’s English-speaking allies as integrated components of the U.S. power structure? Of course, they are not formally integrated into the U.S. state. But the real, effective borders of countries are much fuzzier than the legal lines drawn on maps. The United States exercises different levels of influence over its sovereign territory, extraterritorial possessions, the English-speaking allies, NATO allies, other treaty allies, nontreaty allies, client states, spheres of influence, exclusionary zones and even enemy territories. All of these categories are fluid in their memberships and meanings, but taken together they constitute more than just a network of relationships. They constitute a cooperative system of shared sovereignty, something akin to the power structure of the Roman Republic. No other country in the world possesses, has ever possessed, or is likely to possess in this century such a world-straddling vehicle for the enforcement of its will. More to the point, the U.S.-dominated system shows no signs of falling apart. Even the revelation that America and its English-speaking allies have been spying on the leaders of their NATO peers has not led to calls for the dissolution of NATO. The American system may not last forever, but its remaining life may be measured in centuries rather than decades. Cycles of hegemony turn very slowly because systems of hegemony are very robust. The American power network is much bigger, much stronger and much more resilient than the formal American state as such. A RECURRING meme is the idea that the whole world should be able to vote in U.S. presidential elections because the whole world has a stake in the outcome. This argument is not meant to be taken seriously. It is made to prove a point: that the United States is uniquely and pervasively important in the world. At least since the Suez crisis of 1956, it has been clear to everyone that the other countries of the world, whether alone or in concert, are unable to project power beyond their shores without American support. Mere American acquiescence is not enough. In global statecraft, the United States is the indispensable state. One widely held definition of a state is that a state is a body that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a territory. The German sociologist Max Weber first proposed this definition in 1919, in the chaotic aftermath of World War I. Interestingly, he included the qualifier “successfully” in his definition. To constitute a real state, a government cannot merely claim the sole right to use force; it must make this claim stick. It must be successful in convincing its people, civil-society groups and, most importantly, other states to accept its claim. In the twenty-first century, the United States effectively claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force worldwide. Whether or not it makes this claim in so many words, it makes it through its policies and actions, and America’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force is generally accepted by most of the governments (if not the peoples) of the world. That is not to say that all American uses of force are accepted as legitimate, but that all uses of force that are accepted as legitimate are either American or actively supported by the United States. The world condemns Russian intervention in Ukraine but accepts Saudi intervention in Yemen, and of course it looks to the United States to solve conflicts in places like Libya, Syria and Iraq. The United States has not conquered the world, but most of the world’s governments (with the exceptions of countries such as Russia, Iran and China) and major intergovernmental organizations accept America’s lead. Very often they ask for it. This American domination of global affairs extends well beyond hegemony. In the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom was a global hegemon. Britannia ruled the waves, and from its domination of the oceans it derived extraordinary influence over global affairs. But China, France, Germany, Russia and later Japan continually challenged the legitimacy of British domination and tested it at every turn. Major powers certainly believed that they could engage independently in global statecraft and acted on that belief. France did not seek British permission to conquer its colonies; Germany did not seek British permission to conquer France. Twenty-first-century America dominates the world to an extent completely unmatched by nineteenth-century Britain. There is no conflict anywhere in the world in which the United States is not in some way involved. More to the point, participants in conflicts everywhere in the world, no matter how remote, expect the United States to be involved. Revisionists ranging from pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine to Bolivian peasant farmers who want to chew coca leaves see the United States as the power against which they are rebelling. The United States is much more than the world’s policeman. It is the world’s lawgiver. The world state of so many fictional utopias and dystopias is here, and it is not a nameless postmodern entity called global governance. It is America. Another word for a world state that dominates all others is an “empire,” a word that Americans of all political persuasions abhor. For FDR liberals it challenges cherished principles of internationalism and fair play. For Jeffersonian conservatives it reeks of foreign adventurism. For today’s neoliberals it undermines faith in the primacy of market competition over political manipulation. And for neoconservatives it implies an unwelcome responsibility for the welfare of the world beyond America’s shores. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the United States has become an imperial world state—a world-empire—that sets the ground rules for smooth running of the global economy, imposes its will largely without constraint and without consideration of the reasonable desires of other countries, and severely punishes those few states and nonstate actors that resist its dictates. No one ever likes an empire, but despite Ronald Reagan’s memorable phrase, the word “empire” is not inseparably linked to the word “evil.” When it comes to understanding empire, history is probably a better guide than science fiction. Consider the Roman Empire. For several centuries after the ascension of Augustus, life under Rome was generally freer, safer and more prosperous than it had been under the previously independent states. Perhaps it was not better for the enslaved or for the Druids, and certainly not for the Jews, but for most people of the ancient Mediterranean, imperial Rome brought vast improvements most of the time. ANCIENT ANALOGIES notwithstanding, no one would seriously suggest that the United States should attempt to directly rule the rest of the world, and there is no indication that the rest of the world would let it. But the United States could manage its empire more effectively, which is something that the rest of the world would welcome. A winning strategy for low-cost, effective management of empire would be for America to work with and through the system of global governance that America itself has set up, rather than systematically seeking to blunt its own instruments of power. For example, the United States was instrumental in setting up the International Criminal Court, yet Washington will not place itself under the jurisdiction of the ICC and will not allow its citizens to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Similarly, though the United States is willing to use UN Security Council resolutions to censure its enemies, it is not willing to accept negotiated limits on its own freedom of action. From a purely military-political standpoint, the United States is sufficiently powerful to go it alone. But from a broader realist standpoint that takes account of the full costs and unintended consequences of military action, that is a suboptimal strategy. Had the United States listened to dissenting opinions on the Security Council before the invasion of Iraq, it would have saved hundreds of billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives. The United States might similarly have done well to have heeded Russian reservations over Libya, as it ultimately did in responding to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. A more responsible (and consequently more effective) United States would subject itself to the international laws and agreements that it expects others to follow. It would genuinely seek to reduce its nuclear arsenal in line with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would use slow but sure police procedures to catch terrorists, instead of quick but messy drone strikes. It would disavow all forms of torture. All of these policies would save American treasure while increasing American power. They would also increase America’s ability to say “no” to its allies when they demand expensive U.S. commitments to protect their interests abroad. Such measures would not ensure global peace, nor would they necessarily endear the United States to everyone across the world. But they would reduce global tensions and make it easier for America to act in its national interests where those interests are truly at stake. Both the United States and the world as a whole would be better off if Washington did not waste time, money and diplomatic capital on asserting every petty sovereign right it is capable of enforcing. A more strategic United States would preside over a more peaceful and prosperous world. In pondering its future course, Washington might consider this tale from the ancient world: When Cyrus the Great conquered the neighboring kingdom of Lydia, he allowed his army to loot and pillage Lydia’s capital city, Sardis. The deposed Lydian king Croesus became his captive and slave. After Cyrus taunted Croesus by asking him how it felt to see his capital city being plundered, Croesus responded: “It’s not my city that your troops are plundering; it’s your city.” Cyrus ordered an immediate end to the destruction.